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 Executive Summary  
 
Sjoberg Evashenk Consulting and Cornell University have completed a study of the City 
of Los Angeles’ labor negotiation policies, processes and practices, under contract with 
the City Controller’s Office.  The objectives of the study are to: 
• Review negotiations executed within the last three years for “lessons learned,” as 
well as review negotiations currently underway. 
• Evaluate and “map” the City’s current collective bargaining process. 
• Conduct a nationwide search for promising practices the City could incorporate 
into the collective bargaining process. 
• Evaluate the fiscal impacts of labor negotiations. 
• Evaluate the role of and incentives for each party in the process. 
• Evaluate the labor-management relationships outside of the bargaining process. 
• Identify opportunities for improving labor-management relations. 
 
Cornell University addressed the City’s current labor relations process and identified 
areas for improvement or consideration (Sections I and III), while Sjoberg Evashenk 
Consulting focused on the financial implications of the City’s collective bargaining 
practices (Section II). 
 
Overview 
 
The City of Los Angeles employs approximately 46,000 individuals, the vast majority of 
whom are represented by 25 unions in 40 bargaining units.  In fact, only two percent of 
City’s employees are not represented by a bargaining unit.  In Los Angeles, the Mayor, 
City Council, Executive Employee Relations Committee (EERC) and the City 
Administrative Officer (CAO) have important roles representing management in the 
negotiations with its employees’ 40 bargaining units.  
 
It is a challenging time for those engaged in the labor negotiations process in the City of 
Los Angeles.  Fourteen of the 40 bargaining units are operating under Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOU) that expired in 2003 and 2004, while an additional eight will 
expire by the end of fiscal year 2005-06.  The fiscal concerns expressed by many elected 
officials, the pressure exerted on union leadership from rank and file members to 
replicate the contract negotiated by the Department of Water and Power with the IBEW 
in 2005, and extensive and impassioned press coverage are also contributing factors.  In 
addition, there is not a great deal of flexibility, as salaries and benefits make up nearly 70 
percent of the city’s annual $4 billion general funds budget.  However, the City’s recent 
agreement with the Police Protective League provides an example to build upon in future 
negotiations.  
 
In Sections I and II of the report, recommendations are presented to assist City decision 
makers in the day-to-day processes and practice of labor negotiations.  For example, 
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these sections discuss expanding the City’s internal capacity to engage in labor relations 
by increased training, more departmental involvement in negotiations and re-establishing 
a labor relations specialist classification.  Also, clarifying and simplifying MOU contract 
language and increasing the fiscal information provide opportunities for process 
improvements. 
 
Section III of this report outlines a variety of strategies, including promising practices 
from other parts of the country that could be undertaken to improve the likelihood that 
labor and management can move forward together to build a better future for the City of 
Los Angeles.  They include “opening the City’s books” to the unions to assure 
transparency, engaging the unions to help identify opportunities to achieve efficiencies 
and develop a citywide strategic plan, and expanding the breadth of economic 
development within the City.  
 
It is a positive sign and important to note that in our discussions with the leaders who will 
be shaping the future of labor relations in the City, there were very few individuals who 
disagreed with the ideas presented here.  Some expressed understandable skepticism that 
all of those involved would be willing or able to put aside history, be able to follow 
through given all of the competing demands for their time and attention, and/or risk 
alienating key constituents by doing what is right for the City (and, ultimately, for their 
constituents).  We understand these obstacles, and others, very well.  Over the last three 
decades the Cornell University team has worked with hundreds of organizations and 
repeatedly witnessed how labor and management have either been able to work together 
to overcome serious challenges and achieve significant results, or failed to work together 
and hurt themselves and those they represent.  In Los Angeles in 2006, an historic 
opportunity is available if the parties involved are willing to work together. 
 
The report is organized into the following three sections: 
• Section I –  Opportunities to Improve the Labor Negotiation Process 
• Section II – Fiscal Implications of the Labor Negotiation Process 
• Section III – Additional Ideas for Consideration 
 
In Section I, we offer suggestions on how the negotiating process could be improved.  In 
Section II, we identify opportunities to provide additional fiscally-related information on 
individual MOUs to assist the City during deliberations. In Section III, we describe seven 
consistent underlying themes that significantly impact labor relations and negotiations, 
and provide additional ideas for consideration. These three areas are described more fully 
in the following sections. 
 
Section I –  Opportunities to Improve the Labor Negotiation Process 
We interviewed over one hundred people involved in the labor negotiations process in 
Los Angeles, and were repeatedly impressed by their intelligence and commitment.  The 
managers, union officials, and elected officials and staff were as thoughtful, resourceful, 
engaging and concerned as any we have ever met.  And yet, Los Angeles is facing a 
challenging time in labor relations.  Some of these challenges are described in more detail 
in Section III.  Other contributing factors are structural in nature, and largely reflect the 
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shared power inherent in local government.  In this study we have chosen to focus on 
those facets of the labor negotiations process that can be most readily addressed.  In this 
section, we describe five barriers that are directly affecting the negotiations process, and 
offer recommendations.   
 
Based on our review of the City’s labor negotiation process, we believe there are five 
barriers currently limiting the effectiveness of Los Angeles’ negotiations and labor 
relations activities.  They are: 
1. There is no citywide labor relations philosophy, and the City is inconsistent and 
uncoordinated at times in its approach. 
2. Labor relations as a profession has been neglected in the City.  Many 
departments are not fully engaged in the negotiating process. 
3. Overall, tensions between labor and management have been increasing, and 
proven methods to help reduce conflict are not being used as extensively as they 
could be. 
4. The bonus terms, language and provisions in MOUs are currently not easily 
managed or monitored. 
5. Perspective is being lost by some of those involved. 
Citywide Labor Relations Philosophy 
In Los Angeles, coordinating activities, sharing information, and implementing decisions 
have been problematic at times.  The efforts of the city departments, the CAO, the 
Personnel Department, the EERC, the City Council and the Mayor’s Office are not 
entirely integrated.  Nor are discussions regularly held that could clarify and resolve 
differences, and help ensure that the city is presenting a unified approach to the unions.  
No protocols have been developed for working through differences of opinion or for 
communicating consistently with the unions.  This has led to situations where one or 
more of the parties representing the city have not supported each other, and/or have allied 
with the unions.    
Neglecting Labor Relations as a Profession  
We have noticed a trend in the public sector, as labor relations professionals retire and 
budget pressures mount, to underestimate the skill sets required for these positions, and to 
hire new staff with little experience or training.  Los Angeles has been doing this for 
some time.  The Labor Relations Specialist job classification was eliminated years ago, 
and there has been movement throughout the city into these positions of people from 
many different job classes who usually have no labor relations background, and often do 
not stay for a significant length of time.  This is compounded by a lack of training in 
labor relations, and by the policy followed by at least one department of rotating staff 
every two years.  This turnover and inexperience has often led to a lack of institutional 
memory, and to the unions having much more experience and knowledge of the history 
of negotiations and conditions within the departments.  
Increasing Labor Management Tensions  
The day-to-day interactions in the workplace, when poor, can become a catalyst for 
grievances and expensive arbitrations and lawsuits.  The quality of supervisory and 
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managerial practices, and how well grievances are handled, can have a great effect on the 
negotiations themselves.  If done poorly, negotiations can become a lightning rod for 
what has occurred during the life of the contract. 
There are a variety of methods that can be used to reduce conflict during and between 
negotiations.  Various forms of alternative dispute resolution are available and are very 
effective, although they are not incorporated in Los Angeles nearly as much as they could 
be.  For example, grievance mediation, which inserts a mediation step into the grievance 
process, has been found to be very useful at all levels of government.1  It is a provision in 
many of the MOUs, but is not used extensively.   
Managing MOU Terms, Language and Provisions 
Los Angeles has many types of negotiated bonuses, and they cover a wide variety of 
areas, including night-shift differentials, special job skills such as flying a helicopter or 
bilingual work, tools and uniform allowances, informal compensation for staff who are 
working out of title (sometimes for years), and hazard pay for SWAT and bomb-squad 
members.  Permanent bonuses alone cost the city over $117 million per year.  While 
many of these are common in municipalities, and play an important role in retention and 
recruitment, there are problems with the way the system has developed and been 
administered over the years. 
As discussed more fully in Section II of the report, while these terms have been relatively 
easy to negotiate, they have become very difficult to administer.  The payroll system has 
struggled to adequately reflect bonuses and supervisors have been inconsistent 
implementing temporary bonuses. 
Perspective is Increasingly Being Lost by Those Involved 
Due to a variety of challenges, we saw that perspective on labor management relations 
among some of the involved parties from both groups was being lost.  Effective labor 
relations is almost always highly dependent upon the ability of the parties involved to 
maintain perspective and develop respectful and honest working relationships.  When this 
fails, it is far too easy to attribute unsavory motives, become increasingly petty, and/or 
justify one’s own poor behavior.  Once the ability to see the other parties as human 
beings with a legitimate role to play is lost, it is easier to begin to believe one’s own 
rhetoric.  Another critical consideration here is the perception of many citizens (and much 
of the press) that city government is ineffective, wasteful and filled with workers who are 
already overpaid.  Instead of becoming increasingly alienated from each other, labor and 
management need to be able to work together to fix what is broken, enhance services and 
improve their image with much of the public. 
 
Section II – Fiscal Implications of the Labor Negotiation Process 
 
In Los Angeles, each of the 40 MOUs resulting from labor negotiations are complex 
contracts that generally bind the parties for the duration of the agreement – usually three 
years, but occasionally for two or five years.  The MOUs provide cost of living 
allowances (COLA), permanent and temporary bonuses and other premium payments.  
                                                 
1  Osborne, David and Peter Plastrik.  The Reinventor’s Fieldbook: Tools for Transforming Your 
Government.  San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000. 
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Particularly in agreements with the City’s largest unions, these MOUs are effectively 
contracts for hundreds of millions of dollars to provide needed City services.   
 
Because of their importance, the negotiations surrounding MOUs are given great weight 
by the Mayor, City Council, EERC and CAO.  Estimates of the MOU fiscal impacts are 
provided by the CAO using information gathered from the City Controller’s payroll 
system and other sources.  Generally, we found that the CAO’s estimation and projection 
processes were reasonably based on the limited data available from the Controller’s 
legacy payroll system.  Consequently, we focused our study on opportunities to provide 
additional, more detailed fiscally-related information to assist the City’s decision makers 
during negotiations and deliberations.  In this Section we address the following three 
areas: 
• Expanding the use of newly available payroll data to provide not only more 
specificity regarding the fiscal impacts of the MOU being negotiated, but more 
information on the benefits received over the past negotiations. 
• Assuring that MOU terms and language can be efficiently and effectively 
administered and implemented by the Controller’s Office and departmental 
payroll offices. 
• Providing additional perspective regarding the MOU salaries being negotiated by 
benchmarking these salaries against what other Los Angeles Region employers 
pay for similar services. 
 
Future Cost Estimates of Labor Agreements Should Be More Detailed 
Historically, the CAO’s cost estimates of the salary and bonus impacts of individual labor 
agreements were reasonable given the data available for calculating projections.  
Hampered by the poor functionality of the City Controller’s legacy payroll system, 
additional analysis of the impact of certain MOU provisions, particularly those related to 
bonuses and overtime, was difficult and imprecise.  However, as the Controller’s new 
system (known as PaySR) has evolved, a broader range of fiscally-related analyses can 
now be conducted.  With the data now available on PaySR, we were able to analyze and 
unbundle bonuses for selected MOUs, identify overtime trends and calculate hypothetical 
salary scenarios.   
With these expanded tools, the City’s decision makers now have the tools available for 
creating more detailed and accurate fiscal information from which to make their 
decisions.  Moreover, this depth of detail will afford the creation and tracking of fiscal 
impacts of past negotiations and will allow for deliberating salary and compensation 
changes on a complete rather than incremental basis. 
Clearer MOU Language Will Reduce City Controller Payroll Costs 
The City Controller’s Office administers the payroll processing for all City departments, 
except the Department of Water and Power.  As the payroll administrator, it implements 
the salary, premium pay and permanent bonus terms and conditions of MOUs after they 
are approved by the City Council.  Since each of the 40 MOUs contains uniquely 
negotiated terms, the process to modify the Controller’s payroll system to assure that 
each City employee receives the pay and bonuses that they are qualified for is a 
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significant effort – in many cases involving re-programming the system to identify, and 
pay, those eligible. 
The staff resources and programming effort involved is exacerbated by the inconsistent, 
complex and sometimes ambiguous terms negotiated between the City and the labor 
unions in many MOUs.  When the MOU language is overly complex, vague or 
imprecise, the City Controller incurs unnecessary costs to interpret, administer and 
implement the MOU’s terms and conditions. 
Numerous examples we identified demonstrate that more consistent MOU language, 
clarification of the intent of some provisions and coordination with Controller staff 
before MOUs are finalized would reduce the cost and resources needed to administer and 
implement labor agreements. 
Comparing Salaries for City Positions with Similar Private and Public Sector Jobs 
Adds Perspective 
Los Angeles City employees are among the highest paid public sector workers in the 
region and nationally. Additionally, the robust retirement and health plans that Los 
Angeles City employees enjoy are significant benefits not seen in many comparable jobs.   
Information on the comparison of City salaries against a benchmarked group of similar 
public and private sector wages within the Los Angeles Region would provide decision 
makers with additional insights during deliberations. 
In the six job classifications we sampled, the pay received by City employees is from 26 
percent to 72 percent higher than salaries paid for comparable positions in the private 
sector within the Los Angeles Region.  For illustrative purposes, the small sample of  
City positions we reviewed against comparative public and private sector salaries within 
the Los Angeles Region provides additional information that could be used by decision 
makers during salary negotiations and deliberations. 
 
Section III – Additional Ideas for Consideration 
 
It is a challenging time for those engaged in the labor negotiations process in the City of 
Los Angeles.  The fiscal concerns expressed by many city officials, the pressure exerted 
on union leadership from rank and file members to replicate the contract negotiated by 
the Department of Water and Power with the IBEW in 2005, and extensive and 
impassioned press coverage are contributing factors.  In addition, there is not a great deal 
of flexibility, as salaries and benefits make up nearly 70 percent of the city’s annual $4 
billion general fund budget.2 
 
This is occurring while Los Angeles is also working at reducing crime and addressing 
such significant issues as education, transportation, affordable housing, gangs, poverty, 
pollution, an aging infrastructure, and the worst homeless problem in the nation.  
According to a recent study by the city-commissioned Los Angeles Economy Project, 
there is also a widening gap between high-wage and low-wage jobs.  Job growth in Los 
                                                 
2  Barrett, Beth.  “L.A. Must Get Lean.  Mayor Vows to Cut City Budget Deficit.”  Daily News (Los 
Angeles).  March 6, 2006. 
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Angeles has been weak compared with the state and the rest of the country, and has been 
concentrated in the western and northern parts of the city.3 
 
A city and its unions have a symbiotic relationship.  The people who work for the city 
create a tableau on which the rest of the city’s political, social and economic activity 
takes place.  How effectively and efficiently city services are performed greatly 
influences the amount businesses are willing to invest in the city, as well as the ability of 
the city to attract residents and tourists.  When city services are poor, or so expensively 
delivered that the economic health of the city is endangered, losses escalate, and negative, 
reinforcing consequences often occur.4  Most of us have visited or lived in cities where 
this has happened. 
 
Consequently, it became clear during the course of the study that, in addition to the labor 
negotiations process itself (discussed in Section I), seven underlying themes impact labor 
relations and negotiations in Los Angeles and need to be addressed.  These seven themes 
are: 
1. Many believe that Los Angeles City Government could deliver services more 
efficiently and effectively. 
2. Many City union leaders are skeptical about the City’s assertion that there is a 
serious fiscal crisis looming. 
3. The impact of the 2005 Department of Water and Power/IBEW contract on the 
expectations of many of the other unions’ rank and file members has been 
substantial. 
4. As in all levels of government across the country, the City faces a looming  
succession planning crisis that warrants immediate attention. 
5. Los Angeles lacks a substantial, coordinated, citywide strategic plan that involves 
major stakeholders, including the unions. 
6. The City needs to find a way to produce substantial economic development, and 
“expand the pie” for the entire workforce, both private and public, through 
economic development, or labor relations tensions will likely increase. 
7. While some notable labor-management efforts have occurred, labor-management 
committees in the City have not achieved their full potential for a variety of 
reasons. 
 
Summary of Recommendations 
The Mayor and City Council should consider the following recommended actions, 
approaches and initiatives as they proceed with labor negotiations with the City’s 
employee bargaining units. 
 
 
                                                 
3  Cleeland, Nancy.  “L.A. Group Strives to Build a Better Workforce.”  Los Angeles Times.  February 26, 
2006. 
4  Senge, Peter.  The Fifth Discipline.  (revised ed.)  New York: Doubleday, 2006.  This is a clear 
exposition   of systems thinking, where these types of dynamics are described in detail. 
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Recommendations from Section I – Improving the Labor Negotiation Process: 
• Adopt a citywide guiding philosophy for labor relations and negotiations, and a set of 
protocols to ensure consistency and coordination.  This should include: 
o Reaching agreement with the Mayor, City Council, CAO and key department 
heads on the approach to be used in dealing with labor.  Even if a full 
development of a guiding philosophy cannot be reached, it is essential to set 
protocols to increase coordination and consistency of the City’s approach. 
o Obtaining common agreement among the City’s management team on such 
things as what items to pursue, gathering comparable salary data, the range of 
settlement parameters, the true costs of previous negotiations, and the 
negotiation approach the City will employ with the unions. 
• Re-establish the Labor Relations Specialist position in the City and recruit from 
departments individuals with the right skill sets and interest. 
• Provide a comprehensive training program that includes the technical process of 
negotiations, contract administration, FLSA and PERB rules and regulations, 
arbitration process, and concepts of Interest-Based Bargaining and labor-management 
cooperation.  
• Consider the analytical workload of the CAO’s labor negotiators and determine if 
additional staff are needed. 
• Increase the use of proven alternative dispute resolution strategies and methods, and 
move towards interest-based bargaining practices where appropriate, including: 
o Employing the most straightforward grievance mediation process as soon as 
possible. 
o For particularly contentious negotiations, obtain the services of an 
experienced labor relations facilitator from outside the City who is 
knowledgeable in interest-based bargaining techniques. 
o Considering the establishment of a program similar to King County, 
Washington’s InterLocal Conflict Resolution Group that provides a wide 
range of mediation and alternative dispute resolution services. 
• Those who are in a position to do so could help by mediating conflicts, assisting the 
parties in gaining perspective, and encouraging participation by labor and 
management in adopting proactive solutions that will benefit the City, as well as those 
negotiating. 
 
Recommendations from Section II – Fiscal Implications of the Labor Negotiation 
Process: 
The Mayor and City Council should consider the following actions during their labor 
negotiations: 
• Utilize the functionality of PaySR to identify and unbundle permanent and temporary 
bonuses to create analyses to build full compensation models for job classifications 
and compare them to prior MOU agreements, and determine their fiscal impact 
including retirement and other benefits they may generate. 
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• Clarify which bonuses should be added to base pay and be subject to pension benefits 
and future COLAs and which should not. 
• Analyze compensation provisions from a broader, multi-year basis rather than on an 
incremental, add-on to existing MOU terms. 
• Determine the accuracy of MOU fiscal projections and estimates by conducting 
periodic “budget to actual” comparisons during the term of the contracts. 
• Assess the impact of departmental overtime charges under typical MOU salary and 
bonus terms and conditions using historic data during negotiations. 
• Obtain benchmark private and public sector comparative salary data for the Los 
Angeles Region for the positions covered by the MOU during negotiations. 
• Establish common MOU language for similar bonus and premium pay categories 
with input from the Controller’s Office to ease in the interpretation and 
implementation of agreed upon terms.  Ensure MOU provisions include a clear 
description of the unit of measure (e.g. specific pay period or hours) used. 
• Assure that MOUs contain a clear outline of qualifying conditions for bonuses, 
allowances and other pay premiums that specify the job classification and criteria 
needed to receive the benefit, and a specific date when the payment should be 
received. 
• Clarify which bonuses or pay premiums are subject to tax withholding and inclusion 
on the employee’s W-2. 
 
Areas to Contemplate from Section III – Additional Ideas for Consideration 
 
• “Open the City’s Books” to all stakeholders to assure transparency. This would 
include: 
o Holding meetings with unions where experts would discuss budgetary issues. 
o Considering data-driven trends, rather than economic peaks and valleys, 
during negotiations. 
• Incorporate a variety of strategies, including labor-management cooperation, to assist 
in identifying efficiencies, streamlining City operations, increasing productivity, 
improving customer service, and enhancing the quality of work life.  This would 
include: 
o Conducting management audits and reviews, and training managers and 
supervisors in performance management techniques. 
o Considering a reporting approach similar to New York City’s Mayor’s 
Management Report that outlines how well vital services are being performed. 
o Establishing labor-management committees focused on improving outcomes, 
that might initially address such areas as workers compensation, risk 
avoidance, pension and health challenges. 
o Addressing the implications of the Department of Water and Power’s salary 
imbalances with other City departments, and the long-term IBEW labor 
contract. 
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o Considering providing incentives for efficiencies and cost savings obtained 
through labor-management initiatives 
• Address the succession planning issue with the unions. This would include: 
o Establishing a joint labor-management committee to research succession 
planning and present research and ideas to the City’s leadership. 
o Building on existing mentoring, vocational and apprenticeship programs to 
create opportunities for youth in Los Angeles. 
o Enhancing the effectiveness of the managers and supervisors who will be 
promoted to fill vacancies created by retirements. 
• Develop a citywide strategic plan for all of Los Angeles, including plans for specific 
policy areas.  Involve the major stakeholders, including the unions, in: 
o Expanding on past initiatives by addressing broader strategic goals and 
including a wide range of stakeholders (e.g. unions, businesses, community 
and faith-based organizations). 
• Bring together major stakeholders, including the unions, to do both short and long-
term economic development planning for the City as well as for the region, including: 
o Building on the City’s “brand” by investing time and energy on a few projects 
with a high potential for adding new revenues and higher paying jobs. 
 
 11
Introduction 
 
The City of Los Angeles is the second most populous city in the United States with an 
estimated 2005 population of 3.96 million persons.  Founded in 1781, Los Angeles has 
seen continuous growth in population and economic diversity from its beginnings as a 
provincial outpost to its current standing as a worldwide center of commerce, 
entertainment and industry.   
A Mayor elected for a 4-year term is the executive officer of the City and a 15-member 
full-time City Council acts as the legislative body enacting ordinances subject to the 
Mayor’s approval.  The Council also adopts a budget, authorizes the number of 
employees in most City departments, creates employee positions and fixes salaries.   The 
City has 40 departments, bureaus, commissions and offices for which operating funds are 
annually budgeted.  Additionally, five departments (the Department of Water and Power, 
Harbor, Airports, and two pension systems), the Community Redevelopment Agency, 
and Housing Authority are under the control of Boards appointed by the Mayor and 
confirmed by the Council. 
 
Budget Formulation and Adoption 
The City of Los Angeles’ fiscal year 2005-06 budget for all funds is approximately $5.95 
billion.  The City Administrative Officer (CAO), appointed by the Mayor and confirmed 
by the Council is the chief financial advisor on budget issues for the Mayor and Council 
and reports directly to both.  By April 20th of each year, the Mayor submits a proposed 
budget to the Council.  The Council examines the proposed budget in public Budget and 
Finance Committee hearings involving the department managers, CAO and staff.  The 
Committee then develops recommendations for Council consideration, and pursuant to 
City Charter, the Council must adopt or modify the proposed budget by June 1st.  
Once the Council has acted, the Mayor has five working days to approve or veto any 
Council changes made to the proposed budget.  In turn, the Council has five working 
days to sustain or override by two-thirds vote the Mayor’s actions.  The result of this 
process is the adopted budget for the next fiscal year. 
 
Labor Negotiation Process 
Employee relations for local government in California is governed by state law.5  In 
1971, the City adopted its own Employee Relations Ordinance as permitted by state law 
that established the following process for labor negotiations: 
Under California law, public sector collective bargaining is referred to as “meet and 
confer”, and contracts with recognized employee organizations are called “Memoranda of 
Understanding” (MOU).   
• Oversight is provided by the Employee Relations Board (ERB), which has 
powers comparable to those of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and 
Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) of the State of California.  It adopts 
rules and resolves disputes arising out of the labor relations process. 
                                                 
5  Myers, Milias, Brown Act, California Government Code § 3500 et seq. 
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• Bargaining instructions are recommended to the City Council by the Executive 
Employee Relations Committee (EERC), consisting of the Mayor, President of 
the City Council, President Pro Tempore of the City Council, and Chairs of the 
Finance and Personnel Committees of the City Council.  The EERC is required to 
meet no later than April 1 of each year with the City’s management representative 
(the CAO) to give advice and instructions with respect to the City’s bargaining 
position in the meet and confer process (this provision was added in June of 
1978). 
• All Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) negotiated by the CAO and the unions 
must be ratified by the City Council.  Most MOUs begin in July and end in June.  
Traditionally, they have been for three years, although there have been occasional 
exceptions of two or five years. 
• The City Administrative Officer (CAO) is the Management Representative and 
chief negotiator. The seven CAO negotiators are assigned to specific 
Departments.  In addition, the CAO performs many other important labor 
relations functions, which include: 
o Keep the Mayor and City Council informed, and provide advice regarding 
the status of employee relations activities in the City  
o Provide advice and technical staff assistance to department and office 
heads and management representatives in meeting and conferring with 
representatives of recognized employee organizations, prepare memoranda 
of understanding, deal with impasses and job actions, and assure 
reasonable uniformity among departments in all aspects of the City’s 
employee relations program 
o Monitor and evaluate the employee relations program and recommend 
appropriate revisions to policy, procedures and rules to determining bodies 
or officials 
o Conduct special negotiations on issues such as retirement 
benefits/separation pay plans, impact of reorganizations, alternative work 
schedules, changes in discipline procedures, LAPD Consent Degree 
impact or payroll system modifications 
o Lead or participate in Joint Labor Management Committees on flexible 
benefits, employee parking, worker’s compensation and safety, PRIMA 
and security consolidation 
o Represent the City or provide advice to departments in unfair employee 
relations practice hearings or grievance arbitrations 
o Monitor implementation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and provide 
ongoing advice and training to City departments as well as help develop 
modules in the City’s payroll system to ensure compliance 
o Issue Employee Relations Bulletins and coordinate regular meetings of 
Personnel Directors to assist departments in understanding employee 
relations issues 
o Conduct and respond to surveys of salary and benefit practices 
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o Recommend salaries for new classifications and pay grades; establish pay 
grade descriptions and approve all pay grade upgrade requests  
o It is important to note that the CAO is also responsible for city finances, 
and does budget projections for the city as well.   
• The City Attorney’s Office acts in an advisory capacity, and provides support to 
the EERC. 
• The chief administrative officer of each City department or office, or the 
employee authorized by him/her to act in such capacity, is designated as the 
City’s management representative in formal relationships with representatives or 
recognized employee organizations on matters which are properly within the 
scope of representation and on which the head of the department or office is the 
determining official.  Memoranda of understanding on matters concerning which 
the head of a department or office is the determining body or official shall become 
effective when approved by that body or official. 
• The Personnel Department provides reports and recommendations to the Board 
on those issues and elements of the employee relations program involving 
Personnel Department responsibilities.  In addition, Personnel provides advice 
and assistance to department heads and management representatives, and keeps 
the Mayor, City Council and other officials advised of such matters.  Personnel 
also issues guidelines for departmental working rules, coordinates the views of 
concerned departments on the appropriateness of proposed representation units, 
maintains liaison with and provides assistance to the employee relations staff, and 
provides training to assist operating departments.6,7 
The City of Los Angeles currently employs approximately 46,000 persons, the vast 
majority of whom are represented by 25 unions within 40 bargaining units (only 2% of 
the City’s employees are not represented by a bargaining unit).  Currently, the City faces 
a substantial challenge since employees in 14 of the bargaining units are working under 
MOUs that expired in 2003 and 2004, and an additional eight MOUs will expire by June 
30, 2006.  
Scope and Methodology 
 
In response to Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa’s request, Los Angeles City Controller Laura 
Chick issued a solicitation for proposals in September 2005 to conduct a study of the City 
of Los Angeles’ labor negotiation policies, processes and practices.  In October 2005 the 
City Controller contracted with Sjoberg Evashenk Consulting, Inc. who subcontracted 
with Cornell University’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations to study the current 
labor relations process and identify areas for improvement, while Sjoberg Evashenk 
focused on the fiscal impacts of the negotiations.  The study’s objectives are to:  
• Review negotiations executed within the last three years for “lessons learned,” as 
well as review negotiations currently underway. 
                                                 
6  City of Los Angeles Employee Relations Ordinance.  February, 1971, September 2000. 
7  City of Los Angeles Employment Division.  “Employee Relations.”  Briefing document.  2005. 
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• Evaluate and “map” the City’s current collective bargaining process. 
• Conduct a nationwide search for promising practices the City could incorporate 
into the collective bargaining process. 
• Evaluate the fiscal impacts of labor negotiations. 
• Evaluate the role of and incentives for each party in the process. 
• Evaluate the labor-management relationships outside of the bargaining process. 
• Identify opportunities for improving labor-management relations. 
 
In preparing this study, we conducted numerous interviews with key stakeholders and 
interested parties.  We also reviewed a wide variety of documents, including many 
provided by those interviewed.  (The names of the Los Angeles organizations whose staff 
participated in the interviews are provided in Appendix A, and a list of the documents 
reviewed in Appendix C.)  Several consultants with extensive experience in city labor 
relations processes and practices assisted in either conducting the interviews or in 
providing valuable background material.  Jonathan Walters of Governing Magazine did a 
search of promising practices.  Fourteen Cornell faculty members contributed to the 
report, as well as faculty from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and UCLA.  In 
addition, we consulted with union and city officials from cities we have worked with, 
including Seattle, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Portland (Oregon), Minneapolis, Cincinnati, 
Detroit, Fort Lauderdale, Portland (Maine), Baltimore and New York. 
 
We reviewed recently negotiated MOUs and the cost estimates prepared by the CAO for 
these agreements.  Generally, we found that the cost estimates that CAO provided to 
EERC and the City Council were based on reasonably calculated cost elements and 
factors available at the time the estimates were prepared.  Consequently, we focused not 
on what these estimates were, but on what additional data would be valuable to decision 
makers during MOU deliberations. 
 
To obtain information on permanent and temporary bonuses, COLAs and other pay 
premiums, we reviewed approximately 30 MOUs negotiated over the past 10 years.  We 
also worked with the City Controller’s Office to analyze payroll data from its legacy 
payroll system and from PaySR, the new system installed in 2004.  Finally, we gathered 
comparative salaries from the California Employment Development Department for the 
Los Angeles Region. 
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Section I:  Opportunities to Improve the Labor-
Management Negotiations Process 
 
We interviewed over one hundred people involved in the labor negotiations process in 
Los Angeles, and were repeatedly impressed by their intelligence and commitment.  The 
managers, union officials, and elected officials and staff were as thoughtful, resourceful, 
engaging and concerned as any we have ever met.  And yet, Los Angeles is facing a 
challenging time in labor relations.  Many of the underlying reasons for this are described 
in Section III.  Other contributing factors are structural in nature, and largely reflect the 
shared power inherent in local government. In this study we have chosen to focus on 
those facets of the labor negotiations process that can be most readily addressed.  In this 
section, we describe five barriers that are directly affecting the negotiations process, and 
offer recommendations.   
 
The negotiations process is described in Appendix B.  The roles and responsibilities of 
those involved in the process have been provided in the Introduction to this study. 
 
Five Barriers to Effective Negotiations and Labor Relations 
 
1. There is no citywide labor relations philosophy, and the city is 
inconsistent and uncoordinated at times in its approach. 
 
In Los Angeles, as in many jurisdictions, management responsibility and power is shared 
among a variety of entities.8 While this has many advantages, it has also led to difficulties 
in articulating a consistent citywide labor relations philosophy and approach.  
Coordinating activities, sharing information, and implementing decisions have also been 
problematic at times.  The efforts of the city departments, the CAO, the Personnel 
Department, the EERC, the City Council and the Mayor’s Office are not entirely 
integrated.  Nor are discussions regularly held that could clarify and resolve differences, 
and help ensure that the city is presenting a unified approach to the unions.  No protocols 
have been developed for working through differences of opinion or for communicating 
consistently with the unions.  This has led to situations where one or more of the parties 
representing the city have not supported each other, and/or have allied with the unions.    
 
2. Labor relations as a profession has been neglected in the city.  
Many departments are not fully engaged in the negotiating 
process. 
 
We have noticed a trend in the public sector, as labor relations professionals retire and 
budget pressures mount, to underestimate the skill sets required for these positions, and to 
hire new staff with little experience or training.  Los Angeles has been doing this for 
some time.  The Labor Relations Specialist job classification was eliminated years ago, 
                                                 
8  Kochan, T.A.  “A Theory of Multilateral Collective Bargaining in City Governments.”  Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review.  July 1974: 525-542.  This classic article is an excellent resource for 
understanding some of the structural challenges inherent in municipal collective bargaining.   
 16
and there has been movement throughout the city into these positions of people from 
many different job classes who usually have no labor relations background, and often do 
not stay for a significant length of time.  This is compounded by a lack of training in 
labor relations, and by the policy followed by at least one department of rotating staff 
every two years.  This turnover and inexperience has often led to a profound lack of 
institutional memory, and to the unions having much more experience and knowledge of 
the history of negotiations and conditions within the departments. (Until very recently, 
one of the largest departments did not even have a Personnel Director, and the 
department has had a history of being very vulnerable with regard to past practices.)    
 
As a result, the unions frequently hold a distinct advantage in their dealings with 
departmental labor relations staff.  This inexperience of staff has, despite the dedication 
of many of them, also led to many missed opportunities, such as the ability to “broker” 
agreements and mediate potential conflicts, as well as to assist their departments in 
coming to negotiations prepared with lists of opportunities to improve operations.  
 
Years ago the CAO’s office had seven negotiators and seven research assistants who 
could take notes, do research, and provide support.  They also worked closely with 
departments in between negotiations to identify and help with the resolution of problems, 
as well as help them prepare for the next round of negotiations.   The long list of other 
responsibilities of the CAO’s labor relations staff described in the Introduction is now 
done by a much smaller group, and each negotiator has to do much of his or her own 
research, as well as take notes during negotiations.  They are also expected to be 
specialists and experts in areas such as family medical leave and the Fair Labor Standards 
Act.  And many of the most experienced staff have either retired, or will be retiring in the 
next five years.  
 
In Los Angeles, it is the unions who have the luxury of preparing well in advance of 
negotiations, who attend training sessions regularly, and who engage in sophisticated 
strategic planning activities, while the city labor relations staff in most cases struggle to 
keep up with their responsibilities.   As one city department General Manager stated, 
“there is rough water ahead, and we are ill prepared.” 
 
3. Overall, tensions between labor and management have been 
increasing, and proven methods to help reduce conflict are not 
being used as extensively as they could be.  
 
Section III of this study describes many of the reasons for the increase in tensions.  
Contract negotiations are one part of the labor-management relationship.  The day-to-day 
interactions in the workplace, when poor, can become a catalyst for grievances and 
expensive arbitrations and lawsuits.  The quality of supervisory and managerial practices, 
and how well grievances are handled, can have a great effect on the negotiations 
themselves.  If done poorly, negotiations can become a lightning rod for what has 
occurred during the life of the contract. 
 
There are a variety of methods that can be used to reduce conflict during and between 
negotiations.  Various forms of alternative dispute resolution are available and are very 
effective, although they are not incorporated in Los Angeles nearly as much as they could 
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be.  For example, grievance mediation, which inserts a mediation step into the grievance 
process, has been found to be very useful at all levels of government.9  It is a provision in 
many of the MOUs, but is not used extensively.  The city’s history of settling claims for 
substantial amounts of money, and the effect on union leadership of having to deal with 
chronically unhappy members, also provide additional incentive to increase the use of 
these methods. 
 
4. The bonus terms, language and provisions in MOUs are currently 
not easily managed or monitored.   
 
Los Angeles has many types of negotiated bonuses, and they cover a wide variety of 
areas, including night-shift differentials, special job skills such as flying a helicopter or 
bilingual work, tools and uniform allowances, informal compensation for staff who are 
working out of title (sometimes for years), and hazard pay for SWAT and bomb-squad 
members.  Permanent bonuses alone cost the city over $117 million per year.  While 
many of these are common in municipalities, and play an important role in retention and 
recruitment, there are widely acknowledged problems with the way the system has 
developed and been administered over the years.  As one union leader said, ”Almost all 
of them are kind of patchwork in response to something evolved over time but not 
necessarily in any kind of context of what prudent management would do.”10  
 
And while they have been relatively easy to negotiate, they have been very difficult to 
administer.  The payroll system has struggled to adequately reflect bonuses, and 
supervisory implementation of the bonus system has often been inconsistent.  The result 
is a great deal of work for administrative and payroll staff, an increased number of 
grievances, as well as additional “salt in the wounds” to those who feel Los Angeles city 
government is poorly run and wasting a great deal of the taxpayer’s money.  (See also 
Section II of this study.) 
 
5. Perspective is increasingly being lost by some of those involved. 
 
William James once said, “The art of wisdom is the art of knowing what to overlook.”  
Effective labor relations is almost always highly dependent upon the ability of the parties 
involved to maintain perspective and develop respectful and honest working 
relationships.  When this fails, it is far too easy to attribute unsavory motives, become 
increasingly petty, and/or justify one’s own poor behavior.  Once the ability to see the 
other parties as human beings with a legitimate role to play is lost, it is easier to begin to 
believe one’s own rhetoric.  Another critical consideration here is the perception of many 
citizens (and much of the press) that city government is ineffective, wasteful and filled 
with ungrateful, spoiled workers who are already overpaid.  Instead of becoming 
increasingly alienated from each other, labor and management need to be able to work 
together to fix what is broken, enhance services and improve their image with much of 
the public. 
                                                 
9  Osborne, David and Peter Plastrik.  The Reinventor’s Fieldbook: Tools for Transforming Your 
Government.  San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000. 
10 Laidman, Dan.  “Bonuses Swell Pay for Police, Firefighters.”  Daily News (Los Angeles).  March 21, 
2006. 
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Section III of this study describes the varied and compelling dynamics that are currently 
operating for many of those involved.  It is understandable that under these 
circumstances, perspective would be lost.  However, it is precisely at times like these that 
perspective is most needed.   
 
Recommendations 
 
Recommendation #1: 
Adopt a citywide guiding philosophy towards labor relations and 
negotiations, and a set of protocols to ensure consistency and 
coordination. 
 
We realize that the separation of governmental powers, political pressures, and the 
vagaries of personality will always make the adoption and implementation of a consistent 
labor relations philosophy and set of protocols challenging.  However, whenever 
consensus can be reached and agreements kept, the city’s ability to be more effective in 
its work with the unions will be enhanced.  We recommend the following be considered: 
 
• An agreement on the labor relations philosophy that would govern the 
approach used by the city in its dealings with labor.  This agreement would be 
reached by the EERC, CAO, City Council, Mayor, Personnel, and key department 
heads. The philosophy, while no doubt challenging to create, could be used as a 
touchstone to determine whether the city’s behavior in a given situation is 
consistent with the goals and values previously established. (Samples from other 
jurisdictions can be provided, if desired.)  It should also be periodically revisited, 
particularly when significant changes in city leadership occur.   The philosophy 
should include: 
 
o The goal for engaging in labor relations processes 
o The climate that the city’s representatives believe should exist as a result of 
implementing these processes 
o The extent to which the city’s fiscal conditions need to be a consideration, 
as well as agreement about those conditions (It may be necessary to provide 
the same sort of opportunity to review the fiscal information to city 
representatives that is suggested for the unions in Section III.) 
o The extent to which and in what manner the economic welfare of 
represented city employees should be a factor (the issue of working towards 
equity could also be addressed) 
o What role, if any, the city’s representatives believe labor has in addressing 
city service delivery issues, work safety issues, cooperating with 
management on major organizational development initiatives, etc.  
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o The expectations city leaders have with respect to how their representatives 
will be treated, and how they will treat union representatives in the process 
o Any other points considered worth including 
• Even if the full development of a guiding philosophy is not possible due to time 
constraints, it is essential that a set of protocols be established to reduce the lack 
of coordination and consistency in the city’s approach to labor relations.  
Ideally, the protocols would be agreed to by the EERC, CAO11, City Council, 
Personnel, Mayor’s office, and key department heads.   Given the separation of 
powers, it may be very difficult to obtain agreement, and if a majority of the 
members of the City Council and all of the City Council members on the EERC 
do not feel this is possible, then the protocols should be adopted, at a minimum, 
by those who are in the Executive branch of government.  Or, perhaps all of the 
parties would agree to use them in certain circumstances. Limited implementation 
would not be ideal, but would still reduce the number of occurrences where the 
city is not operating in a consistent, coordinated fashion.  It is also hoped that the 
need for the protocols would be reduced as conditions improve.  Over time, peer 
and outside pressure to adopt a consistent approach may also increase.  The set of 
protocols could include the following components: 
o A mechanism for ensuring communication of key developments, as well 
as the involvement in critical decisions by all who are affected by them, 
or who have important information and knowledge to share about those 
decisions. (This would include, for example, the requirement that city 
departments participate in and provide input before and during discussions 
related to critical aspects of negotiations that affect their operations.) 
o  A way of sharing information and attempting to mediate disagreements 
between city representatives when there is a difference of opinion on 
how to proceed, before moving forward.  For example, an interim, 
mediated step could be created if a department disagreed with the 
approach being taken in a particular negotiation.  Another way to 
accomplish this, which is fairly common in a number of jurisdictions and 
does occur in Los Angeles at times, is to have several skilled staff 
available to act as “brokers” to move between the parties involved and 
assist in preventing conflicts and also in resolving issues. (See 
recommendation number two in this section). 
o A method to help ensure consistency in approach upfront, wherever 
possible.  Of course, if a change in direction is required because of new 
circumstances or new information, it would be discussed by all of the 
interested parties in advance.  However, moderating a stance once at the 
bargaining table solely because of political pressures on key individuals 
                                                 
11 In Los Angeles, the CAO is responsible to both the Mayor and the City Council.  The Personnel 
Department is a separate department and reports directly to the Mayor.   Both the budget and labor 
relations functions are the responsibilities of the CAO, and these protocols should be particularly helpful 
to the CAO and Personnel. 
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would seriously damage the city’s ability to effectively negotiate in the 
immediate circumstance and in the future.     
o The creation of a vehicle, if possible, that would allow all in city 
government to listen to union requests, whether contractual or 
operational, and to discuss these requests with the appropriate parties in 
management before taking any other action.  This would prevent or 
reduce the undermining of management decisions previously made, or 
about to be made.  If the managerial parties in disagreement could not 
reach resolution, a respected internal or external mediator could work with 
them in an attempt to resolve the issue.  It would be challenging to 
develop, but perhaps a set of consequences could be agreed to in advance 
for those situations where parties who had stated they would follow the 
process ended up acting in bad faith, and conducting “end runs” around 
other managers in city government.  
o A recognition that all contracts are ultimately connected, and that 
coherent, consistent, and rational strategies are needed. 
• Finally, all management representatives, including elected officials, must come 
to common agreement on at least the following issues prior to negotiations with 
a union: 
o What proposals on behalf of management are acceptable to pursue with 
the union?  (For example, in one city with a very strong labor political 
presence the Mayor and City Council members elected not to pursue the 
elimination of double-time, overtime with the unions who already had that 
in their contracts because they felt there were other more important issues 
that would require the use of their political capital.) 
o What comparable jurisdictions will be used in making decisions 
associated with economic parameters?  (Some public sector jurisdictions 
insist upon only using public sector organizations of similar size in 
analyzing economic proposals, others choose to use certain private sector 
jurisdictions for some specific functions, and others use both, including 
data from the last ten years). 
o What are acceptable initial proposals, as well as settlement parameters, 
for wage and benefit issues? (This can include a full pricing sheet with 
various options, and real costs.) 
o What were the true costs of the previous negotiations, including bonuses 
and cost of living adjustments?  (See Section II of this report.) 
o Will negotiations be driven by trends and data analysis, and a 
commitment made to avoid “boom or bust” type of negotiations?  Will 
negotiations focus on the impact of MOU provisions over time, and not as 
much on incremental changes that result from looking only at the current 
negotiations? 
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o What negotiations approach should be utilized to obtain an agreement?  
(In some instances the use of an interest-based bargaining approach may 
be particularly suited to negotiations with one union, but not at all 
appropriate with another.  Decisions associated with the style of 
negotiations to be used can be as important in some cases as the 
parameters established with respect to the issues.) 
o What parameters do city representatives believe are appropriate in 
addressing issues that are likely to be presented by a union?  Which 
issues are likely to surface after negotiations have begun? (This will 
require excellent communication with the city’s representatives who are 
decision-makers in the process, but not physically present at the 
negotiations themselves.) 
 
Recommendation #2: 
Build internal capacity within the City departments to more effectively 
engage in labor relations.  More departments need to become involved 
in the negotiating process. 
 
There are many costs, hidden and obvious, to neglecting the labor relations function, 
including poorer results at the negotiating table, lost opportunities for efficiencies and 
cost savings, and less productivity because of poor relationships in the work place.  In 
addition, the city has paid out approximately $55 million dollars in Fair Labor Standards 
Act settlements in the past fifteen years.  From 2000 through July of 2005, there have 
also been 510 arbitrations and 125 UERP filings involving the six largest unions.12  
 
We recommend the re-establishment of the Labor Relations Specialist position, and 
that plans be made to recruit within the department for people with the right skill sets 
and interest in the field.   This proposal would be cost neutral, as the function is 
already being performed.  (We know of at least two departments where this is currently 
informally being done.)  Partnerships could be formed to develop a training and 
mentoring plan with those within city government who are experienced and effective in 
the positions, qualified volunteers from outside organizations, experienced city retirees, 
and those about to retire.  Perhaps an arrangement could also be made with local 
universities, the California Public Employment Labor Relations Association, and/or the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to provide some on-site training.  
The following are qualities important for labor relations professionals, including 
negotiators: 
• Honest/Trustworthy/Possesses integrity 
• Disciplined (including disciplined in speech) 
• Intellectually curious/demonstrates genuine interest in the perspectives of others 
• Excellent listener 
                                                 
12 City of Los Angeles, Office of the CAO.  April, 2006.  Data was not available on how many of these 
have been won by the city. 
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• Articulate/capable of expressing complex issues clearly and concisely (verbally 
and in writing) 
• Empathetic/able to reflect back to the other party a sincere understanding of 
his/her point of view 
• Tactful and sensitive to the feelings of others 
• Patient 
• Responds appropriately to pressure and conflict, and is not easily intimidated  
• Has accurate insights about his/her behavior and the behavior of others 
• Optimistic about the possible range of fair and reasonable outcomes, while also 
maintaining a strong sense of detachment 
• Values differences and is able to relate respectfully to everyone 
• Possesses good analytic and reasoning skills 
• Creative 
• Good facilitator 
• Emotionally intelligent 
 
The CAO and the Personnel Department currently offer very helpful and well attended 
Human Resources Roundtable discussions quarterly with departmental human resources 
personnel to provide information on important developments.  In addition, training in 
the following areas is recommended for labor relations staff, where appropriate: 
• An understanding of the technical process of negotiations, including the duty and 
scope of bargaining, the timing and order of settlements, and obtaining parameters  
• Contract administration 
• FLSA compliance  
• PERB procedures and case law  
• The arbitration process, including grievance investigation and processing, 
evidentiary standards and objections, and standards of just cause 
• Interest-Based Bargaining, and concepts related to alternative dispute resolution 
• Tenets of labor-management cooperation 
 
There has been little training for line supervisors and managers in the field of labor 
relations in Los Angeles in recent years.  Many do not understand the legitimate role 
played by labor, or the duty of fair representation, although the vast majority of 
supervisors and managers are union members themselves.  (Research and our own 
experience have shown, however, that the union affiliation of managers and supervisors 
does not significantly affect their ability to be loyal to the missions of their 
departments.)13 
                                                 
13 Eaton, Adrienne E. and Paula B. Voos.  “Wearing Two Hats: The Unionization of Public Sector 
Supervisors.”  Going Public, The Role of Labor-Management Relations in Delivering Quality 
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We have also observed over the years that supervisors and managers are often 
uncomfortable with conflict, and that union leaders and shop stewards are not only 
comfortable with conflict, but often carry their roles as “champions of the oppressed” 
with a passion that often evokes a very personal and defensive response from 
management.  Training and mentoring for supervisors and managers in effectively 
handling conflict, as well as in the roles and responsibilities of the union, should help 
in reducing the number of inappropriate supervisory and managerial responses that 
lead to poor morale and increased labor relations costs.   
 
Special attention will also need to be paid to issues such as the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, and medical leave policy.  We recommend an analysis be done of previous 
settlements, grievances and arbitrations to find the areas that will need the most attention.  
The CAO and some departments with a significant number of grievances currently 
perform some of this analysis, and can be helpful here.  (Some jurisdictions take any 
settlement money lost as a result of violations directly from the non-personnel budgets of 
departments that have a history of these problems, as an added incentive for managers in 
those departments to address the issue.) 
 
We also understand there has been very little managerial and supervisory training in 
recent years, largely as a result of fiscal concerns.  Attention needs to be paid to how to 
blend the mentoring discussed earlier with inexpensive yet effective training 
methodologies (again, technology can help here) to elevate the level of supervisory and 
managerial practice.  Benefits of training and mentoring will include a better-managed 
workplace and improved morale, as well as less money spent on settlements, grievances 
and arbitrations.  Enhanced relations between labor and management, and an increased 
ability to listen to union concerns, should also result in less tension in the workplace, a 
more fruitful dialogue around any proposed changes, and fewer “end runs” made to 
appointed and elected officials by the unions.  The ability to work issues out at the lowest 
possible levels will also be enhanced if the protocols on management consistency 
discussed earlier are adopted.  And improved labor relations, because some managers and 
supervisors are performing more effectively as well as understanding the role of the 
unions and reacting less defensively, may reduce or eliminate many of the reasons why 
unions feel the need to go to elected and appointed officials in the first place. For their 
part, unions also have a responsibility, of course, to treat managers and supervisors with 
respect.   
 
Increased attention also needs to be placed on departments becoming more active in 
applying the terms of the MOUs throughout the life of the contract, as well as in 
identifying problem areas and proactively bringing new issues to negotiations that 
could improve departmental operations.  In the past, it has not been uncommon for some 
departments to go into negotiations with no strategy or list of ideas that would be helpful 
to them.  Departments need to take the time to review the current MOU, and ask what has 
worked, what hasn’t worked, and what could be added or done differently that would 
help them in the next round of negotiations.  In addition, more departmental involvement 
in negotiations may assist in reducing the problems caused by adopting MOU language 
                                                                                                                                                 
Government Services.  Eds. Jonathon Brock and David B. Lipsky.  Champaign, IL: Industrial Relations 
Research Association, 2003. 
 24
that is too loose and then subject to differing interpretations later.  (Recently, members of 
the Mayor’s staff have begun working with the CAO and several departments to prepare 
for negotiations.)  Labor Relations Specialists could assist departments with these tasks, 
as well as collaborate with both labor and management to identify and help prevent 
potential problems.  One model that currently works well is in the Los Angeles Police 
Department, where the Employee Relations Administrator works closely with the Police 
Chief and the police union on these issues, as well as on mentoring and developing future 
labor relations staff.  
 
It would be also be very helpful to once again have several individuals responsible for 
doing analytic work in the CAO’s office.  These analysts could be responsible for 
generating the data and research necessary to support the actual face-to-face negotiations 
process, as well as help research important policy areas and new developments.  They 
would work closely with the negotiators, and could also act in an apprenticeship capacity.  
(The ratio of analysts to negotiators is usually one analyst for every three negotiators.)  
 
Recommendation #3:   
Increase the use of proven alternative dispute resolution strategies 
and methods, and move towards interest-based bargaining practices 
where appropriate. 
 
There are a variety of proven alternative dispute resolution methods that can be applied in 
many different ways to government settings, depending upon the circumstances.14  They 
are not a substitute for the formal contractual procedures already in place, but can be used 
very effectively to supplement them when all parties are willing to participate.  We would 
recommend that one of the simplest, most straightforward methods, grievance 
mediation, be incorporated as soon as possible. Grievance mediation involves adding a 
mediation step to the grievance process.  It has been found to be very effective in 
reducing the number of cases that go to arbitration, as well as in helping labor and 
management work together in a more proactive and collaborative way.  As we mentioned 
earlier, grievance mediation is already a provision in many city MOUs, and could be used 
more extensively.   Many resources in California are available to assist with grievance 
mediation, including the California Mediation and Conciliation Service, local 
universities, the California Public Employee Relations Association, and the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service.  A variation on this is to establish departmental Joint 
Labor Management Committees (JLMCs) focused on grievance prevention, where the 
JLMC’s designees are also engaged in joint problem solving, recommending 
improvements in conditions that often result in grievances, fact finding, and mediation at 
the second step (Harvard has been using this method successfully for some time.) 
 
Grievances are often a challenging and time-consuming factor in the workplace for both 
labor and management, and the opportunity to work with them in a more constructive 
fashion may help to build a better relationship.  (This may also speed up the process.  In 
at least one department there is some concern that a time limit is needed for mediation.  
                                                 
14 Lipsky, David B., Ronald L. Seeber, and Richard D. Fincher.  Emerging Systems for Managing 
Workplace Conflict.  San Francisco:  Jossey-Bass.  2003.   
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At times, a union may file for impasse but the mediator does not call back, and many 
months elapse before the mediation occurs.) 
 
Over time, it is hoped that labor relations would progress to the point where some form 
of interest-based bargaining could be used at times when negotiating MOUs.  However, 
it is not always appropriate.  (It generally takes longer, and works best with open 
communication and some trust).  Efforts to do this in Los Angeles in the late 1990’s were 
not particularly effective.  When the correct conditions exist, however, it can be very 
useful.15 SEIU and AFSCME have both had considerable success using it around the 
country.  UCLA has a great deal of relevant experience, and could be very helpful in 
working through the process with any interested parties.   
 
Even if interest based bargaining is not used in negotiating MOUs, the general 
principles should be incorporated in the mediation of grievances described above.  We 
would also recommend the use of many of these principles and methods in other 
disputes within the city, including possible disagreements between city representatives in 
preparation for negotiations, conflicts over classifications of positions, and any other 
critical opportunity where they are likely to be effective.  
 
Interest-based bargaining is based on the early 20th century writings of Mary Parker 
Follett, as well as more recent work by Roger Fisher and William Ury of the Harvard 
Negotiating Project.16,17  It has been used very effectively in the public and private 
sectors for several decades, and its main tenets include:  
• Separating the people from the problem; 
• The sharing of all relevant information; 
• Focusing on the underlying interests of the parties (their concerns, needs, fears 
and hopes) instead of on positions; 
• Recognizing the legitimacy of the other parties interests and needs; 
• Developing multiple creative solutions to satisfy those interests; 
• Understanding that often interests may be different but not conflicting; 
• Using objective criteria/standards to evaluate the options; 
• Incorporating effective follow-up methods; and  
• Focusing on long-term as well as short-term impacts and effects.  
In general, the process often results in more creative and thoughtful approaches to solving 
seemingly intractable problems, enhanced relationships, and improved outcomes and 
agreements that tend to stay in place for a longer period of time.  
                                                 
15 McKersie, Robert B., Susan C. Eaton and Thomas A. Kochan.  “Kaiser Permanente: Using Interest-
Based Negotiations to Craft a New Collective Bargaining Agreement.”  Negotiating Journal.  January 
2004.  This is an interesting, in-depth account of how the parties crafted their agreement.  The Appendix 
contains many references to effective examples of interest based bargaining. 
16 Follett, Mary Parker.  Prophet of Management. Cambridge, MA:  Harvard Business School, 1995. 
17 Fisher, Roger, William Ury, and Bruce Patton.  Getting to Yes, Negotiating Agreement Without Giving 
In (2nd ed.).  New York:  Penguin Books, 1991. 
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In the short term, because of the likelihood that upcoming negotiations will be very 
difficult, the inclusion of a highly skilled labor relations facilitator from outside the 
city who is knowledgeable and experienced in the principles of interest based 
bargaining might be considered for some of the negotiations.  More active participation 
from departments, as well as the assistance of new staff in the Mayor’s office with 
significant labor relations experience, may also be helpful. 
 
At some point, coalition bargaining, at least with regard to some or all of the major 
contract provisions (wages, health care, retirement, layoff and recall provisions, etc.) 
could be considered.  Seattle has done this with considerable success.  It is efficient and 
easier to manage in the long run, although the actual face-to-face negotiations are more 
challenging because of the number of individuals involved. Los Angeles has had some 
experience with this already, having previously negotiated health care provisions with all 
of the unions. 
 
Finally, we would recommend that establishing a program similar to the InterLocal 
Conflict Resolution Group (ILCRG) in King County, Washington State, be considered 
at some point.  This is a shared neutral program begun in 1998 and funded by King 
County.  A variety of mediation and alternative dispute resolution methods are offered 
across jurisdictions, both city and county, with impressive results.  About one third of the 
mediators are employed as managers, one third are affiliated with unions, and one third 
are private practice volunteers.18 We encourage the city, Los Angeles County, and the 
Los Angeles County Federation of Labor to consider establishing a similar entity.   
 
Recommendation #4:   
Assure the appropriateness and manageability of MOU bonus 
provisions and language. 
 
It is critical that problems with the bonus system be addressed to eliminate any wasteful 
expenditures involved, and to bring more credibility to city government.  While Section 
II of this study explores this issue in much more detail, we would like to point out that the 
adoption of a citywide bonus system that is rational, fair and easy to administer would 
also have a positive effect on labor relations in the city.  As mentioned earlier, grievances 
can result from problems related to the inconsistent administration of the current bonus 
system.  At times bonuses are provided by departments as a way to work around such 
practices as leaving critical positions unfilled for years. (Employees who fill these 
positions are then compensated for this out of title work through bonuses.)  Bonuses are 
also sometimes awarded as a way to retain and recruit employees when departments 
experience difficulty in filling positions because the pay is considered to be low for the 
skills required.  Instead of bringing this to the attention of city administrators who could 
make systemic adjustments, department managers sometimes informally use the bonus 
system to compensate these employees.  We recommend these types of practices be 
identified, and sensible and fair policies be implemented in their place. 
 
                                                 
18 McBroom, Ann, and Stephanie Bell, eds.  “About the InterLocal Conflict Resolution Group.”  King 
County, Washington.  2005.  (We will provide this document if there is interest.) 
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Recommendation #5:   
Those who are in a position to do so could help by mediating conflicts, 
assisting the parties in gaining perspective, and encouraging 
participation by labor and management in adopting proactive solutions 
that will benefit the city, as well as those negotiating. 
 
This is a challenging time for labor relations in the city of Los Angeles.  We have no 
illusion that the successful resolution to many of the vexing problems outlined in this 
study will be easy or painless.  Some of the parties appear to be “boxing themselves in” 
with regard to possible options, and making it more difficult to craft workable, fair and 
creative solutions.  In reviewing the situation, the famous line from Jean Renoir’s 1939 
film “The Rules of The Game” comes to mind: “The annoying thing about people is, 
everybody has their reasons.”  When viewed from each of the parties perspectives, it is 
not difficult to see why each party responds the way it does.   
 
We have provided a variety of strategies that could be used to resolve conflicts and assist 
the parties in working together effectively to address the many serious problems facing 
Los Angeles.  The final strategy we would like to suggest is that those who are in a 
position to influence the parties involved in these conflicts use every appropriate 
opportunity to offer perspective, mediate, broker possible solutions, and encourage 
everyone involved to bring their very best intentions and selves to the table.  There are a 
number of leaders in Los Angeles who have positive relationships with many of the 
primary “protagonists” from labor and management that transcend political affiliation or 
faction.  We are aware that some are already attempting to do what we are suggesting, 
and we encourage them to continue to do so, as well as invite others to step forward 
where appropriate. 
 
For years, Los Angeles was considered by many to be the epitome of the “reluctant 
metropolis,” the city that was really an anti-city of “faux rural suburbs.”19  It is 
particularly ironic, and poignant, that these challenges are occurring at a time when Los 
Angeles seems at long last on the verge of leveraging the enthusiasm, energy and 
intelligence of so many, and of embracing its incredible potential as a world class city. 
Los Angeles is a treasure.   It is also needs, more than ever, the very best from those who 
work in it. 
                                                 
19 Fulton, William.  The Reluctant Metropolis: The Politics of Urban Growth in Los Angeles.  Baltimore, 
MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1997 and 2001. 
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Section II – Fiscal Implications of the Labor Negotiation 
Process 
 
In Los Angeles, all bargaining agreements negotiated by the City Administrative Officer 
(CAO) and the unions must be ratified by the City Council to become effective.  Each of 
the 40 Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) resulting from these negotiations are 
complex contracts that generally bind the parties for the duration of the agreement – 
usually three years, but occasionally for two or five years.  The MOUs provide cost of 
living allowances (COLA), permanent and temporary bonuses and other premium 
payments.  Particularly in agreements with the City’s largest unions, these MOUs are 
effectively contracts for hundreds of millions of dollars to provide needed City services.   
 
Because of their importance, the negotiations surrounding MOUs are given great weight 
by the Mayor, City Council, EERC and CAO.  Estimates of the MOU fiscal impacts are 
provided by the CAO using information gathered from the City Controller’s payroll 
system, the Personnel Department and other sources.  Generally, we found that the 
CAO’s estimation and projection processes used to provide MOU fiscal impacts were 
reasonably based on the limited data available from the Controller’s legacy payroll 
system.  Consequently, we focused our study on opportunities to provide additional, more 
detailed fiscally-related information to assist the City’s decision makers during 
negotiations and deliberations.  In this Section we address the following three areas: 
• Expanding the use of newly available payroll data to provide not only more 
specificity regarding the fiscal impacts of the MOU being negotiated, but more 
information on the benefits received over the past negotiations. 
• Assuring that MOU terms and language can be efficiently and effectively 
administered and implemented by the Controller’s Office and departmental 
payroll offices. 
• Providing additional perspective regarding the MOU salaries being negotiated by 
benchmarking these salaries against what other Los Angeles Region employers 
pay for similar services. 
 
Future Cost Estimates of Labor Agreements Can Now Be More 
Detailed 
 
Over the years, the CAO has served as the primary negotiation point representing City 
management in the labor negotiation process.  CAO staff in the Employee Relations 
Division calculate estimates and projects costs related to the various compensation 
provisions discussed and negotiated during the contract discussions that ultimately result 
in a MOU between the City and the respective union.  Historically, CAO staff and 
managers built contract cost estimates and budget projections incrementally— that is, 
beginning at the existing level for most wages and benefits, applying the proposed 
percentage or dollar increases to payroll and compensation data for broad categories of 
employees, and creating estimates of the resulting additional and total costs relative to 
each MOU.  These broad estimates were included in the reports provided to the EERC 
and to City Council for deliberations to approve the contracts. 
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These estimates and projections were reasonable and were built using the best data 
available, which was gathered from the City Controller’s legacy payroll reporting system.  
Therefore, while CAO staff strived to reasonably calculate the impacts and implications 
of negotiated terms, the estimates provided to the EERC and City Council were in gross 
terms and incremental amounts, limited in great part by the lack of detailed salary and 
individual bonus data available.  Recently, more detailed data on salaries, bonuses and 
overtime on many City departments has become available with the PaySR system’s 
implementation.   
 
On a go-forward basis, the City should approach each proposed wage and benefit 
provision with a full-compensation paradigm such that decision-makers not only 
understand the overall and incremental costs, but also the average total compensation 
package and various components within that package for groups of employees.  More 
detailed information now available from PaySR will assist in this process.  This “build 
up” approach will ensure that decision-makers fully appreciate the total compensation 
provided to employees and will enable them to compare among employee groups to 
ensure fair treatment.   
 
The City Controller’s Legacy System Provided Limited Data for Cost Projections 
 
To calculate the impact of proposed increases or changes in compensation elements, the 
CAO staff relied on data obtained from the City Controller’s legacy payroll system.  
While the data are likely reliable, the legacy system generates only consolidated payroll 
information and lacks the capacity to provide detail relative to the many components 
comprising employees’ pay.  This legacy system accommodates basic pay levels and 
steps and coding for shift differentials by job classification, but lumps all other 
“permanent bonuses” into a single sum and functionally cannot “unbundle” or provide 
any level of detail relative to the many bonuses included in employees’ paychecks.  As a 
result, during contract negotiation processes, CAO staff would develop cost estimates and 
projections by applying proposed cost of living percentages to weighted average salaries 
for the related job classifications.   
 
Using the data for each major classification, the proposed cost of living or salary 
percentage increase would be applied to each grand total weighted average to determine 
the new total cost related to that position.  As the following example illustrates, there is a 
limited amount of data that can be used for analytical purposes.  There are certain codes 
related to general categories of bonuses or shift differentials, but the nature or application 
basis of the bonus can only be obtained from individual employee’s payroll histories.  
Another item of note relative to the lack of data generated from the legacy system is 
illustrated in Table A—employees with the same salary range, salary step, and shift code 
(or lack thereof) reflect different amounts of pay without a notation signifying a bonus or 
other differential.  From the data provided in the City Controller legacy system, CAO 
analysts have no way of understanding the reasons for these variations.  
 
 
 
 30
 Table A.  Example of Data Provided in City Controller’s Legacy System 
Salary Wage Report 
Title  (C
lass) 
C
ode 
B
on
u
s 
Sh
ift 
Step 
(Salary) 
Schedule
/ Range 
Current 
Rate 
No of 
Employees 
Present  
Bi-Weekly 
Cost 
Weighted 
Average 
Security Officer 3181         
Council Controlled 3181   1 1671 1,336.80 1 1,336.80  
Council Controlled 3181  2 1 1671 1,411.20 1 1,411.20  
Council Controlled 3181   2 1671 1,411.20 2 4,233.60  
Council Controlled 3181  2 2 1671 1,489.60 1 1,489.60  
Council Controlled 3181   5 1671 1,660.80 20 33,216.00  
Council Controlled 3181   5 1671 1,706.40 1 1,706.40  
Council Controlled 3181  2 5 1671 1,753.60 11 19,289.60  
Council Controlled 3181  2 5 1671 1,801.60 4 7,206.40  
Council Controlled 3181 N 2 2 1671 1,530.40 1 1,530.40  
Council Controlled 3181 N  5 1671 1,753.60 1 1.753.60  
Subtotals       33 73,173.60 2,217.38 
Excerpt from 3/2/06 Wage and Count Report—MOU 18 as an example only. 
 
While the Wage and Count report can be sorted and produced by either department code 
or MOU number, these reports have critical limitations in that, in addition to the lack of 
detail noted above, reports only reflect data at the point in time the report is run; 
therefore, reports for prior periods or period-specific cannot be generated.  Therefore, 
they must be generated at the appropriate time and unless reports are maintained year-to-
year there is no way of taking a backward look at this data to assess the relevance or 
accuracy of the estimates generated from the selected pay periods. 
 
Temporary Bonuses or Allowances Are Not Included in Standard Pay or 
Pensions 
“Temporary” bonuses comprise another important aspect of salaries and wages that may 
substantially impact the compensation costs the City incurs as a result of pay 
negotiations.  Temporary bonuses, allowances, and special pay provisions for such 
reasons as hazardous or obnoxious conditions or temporary assignments are administered 
on an as-earned basis.  These bonuses are instituted by the employee’s supervisor and 
input into the timekeeping/payroll system by the payroll office in the employee’s 
department.  Generally, these temporary bonuses and allowances, unless specifically 
stipulated, are not included in employees’ pension calculations.  Further, these amounts, 
like overtime payments, are not included in the salary calculations presented in the Wage 
and Count report.  
 
Using the legacy system, it is difficult for CAO staff to estimate the cost implications of 
changes or incremental increases to these allowances and temporary bonuses.  Unlike 
bonuses or allowances that could apply to the majority of employees within a job 
classification, and therefore can be reasonably estimated from the Wage and Count 
report, temporary bonuses apply to particular individuals or situations and are typically 
paid on a day-by-day or hourly basis.  Thus, temporary bonuses are far more difficult to 
project, as the legacy system is a payroll system not a personnel system and lacks the 
functionality to sort or select the necessary specific characteristics relative to employees 
who might receive these benefits.  This lack of important data is particularly problematic 
 31
as MOUs contain a multitude of bonuses that are subject to approval and control of 
departmental supervisors and not subject to the same level of scrutiny or oversight as 
other compensation components.  We are told that many of these bonuses in practice may 
be more broadly applied and approved than intended or expected, and thus, far more 
expensive than imagined.  Consequently, as the City can obtain little reliable data on such 
payments, it cannot accurately manage or estimate the costs related to temporary bonuses.   
 
Permanent Bonuses Generally Add to Employees’ Base Salary 
Premium pay and permanent bonuses pose far greater challenges and cost implications 
than allowances.  The various MOU provisions afford a vast variety of elements that 
increase bi-weekly pay checks; some of these premiums and permanent bonuses increase 
an employee’s base pay by moving the salary from one to several pay scale steps while 
many others are set amounts or a percentage calculation that is added to base pay plus 
premium pay.  As an employee earns or is granted these bonuses, their pay record in the 
City Controller’s legacy system is updated for each permanent bonus.  However, once the 
bonus item is entered, the system collapses all the individual bonuses into one bonus 
amount and the only way to access the detail is by querying the system on an employee-
by-employee basis. 
 
The City has agreed to a plethora of permanent bonuses with a multitude of application 
methods.  More common permanent bonuses include bilingual pay differentials and sign 
language premiums for employees using those skills in the course of their work, or 
allowances for boots and uniforms.  While the terms of these payments vary—some in 
annual total dollar stipends or bi-weekly compensation, while others are dollar amounts 
added to the hourly compensation rate.  Moreover, certain permanent bonuses are based 
on flat base pay while others are calculated on base salary plus premium or permanent 
bonuses.   
    
Other permanent bonuses are job or skill specific and contract provisions spell out the 
requirements for the payments.  For example, MOU 5 (executed in May 2005) provides 
“Deputy Pay” for employees in the classes of Assistant Inspector, Code 4208, 
Construction Inspector, Code 7291, and Senior Construction Inspector, Code 7294 and 
stipulates: 
“(these employees) shall receive, in addition to all regular and premium 
compensation, the following amounts for holding valid registration(s) as Deputy 
Building Inspectors in the categories show below in accordance with Ordinance 
No. 162435. 
A. Prestressed Concrete—forty-one cents ($.41) per hour.  Effective July 
1, 2005 the amount shall be one dollar (1.00) per hour. 
B. Reinforced Masonry—one dollar and nineteen cents ($1.19) per hour.  
Effective July 1, 2005 the amount shall be one dollar and twenty-two 
cents ($1.22) per hour. 
C. Reinforced Concrete—one dollar and nine cents ($1.09) per hour, 
except as noted below.  Effective July 1, 2005, the amount shall be 
dollar and ten cents (1.10) per hour except for as noted below. 
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The amounts paid in accordance with subsections A through D above shall be 
adjusted by the same general salary percentage adjustments provided for in 
Appendices C through D.” 
As illustrated in the example above, bonuses may apply to an entire job classification and 
may include an acceleration clause.  Further, this example shows that employees are 
often eligible for more than one bonus should they meet the qualification or specification 
provisions – in this case having more than one registration.  Permanent bonuses similar to 
the aforementioned example may also be particular to certain employees within a 
department or to a specified group of employees.  For example, MOU 5 also applies to 
Harbor Department employees “holding a Reinforced Concrete registration on October 1, 
1979, who shall receive one dollar and sixty-three cents ($1.63) per hour as long as such 
registration is operative”. 
 
This build up of pay from regular pay may involve a number of bonus components.  
Some bonuses and allowance components are based on regular pay (per the pay schedule) 
or may be calculated based upon regular pay plus certain bonuses.  Further, certain 
bonuses are considered as part of regular pay for calculating the amounts of other 
bonuses, pension contributions and overtime.  In the following example, we illustrate the 
build up of the pay of a prototype or hypothetical Firefighter III: 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Article 8.3, Section V(A) of MOU 23 provides “Members of this Unit (with the exception of 
Firefighter I’s and II’s, while on probation) who have and maintain certification as an EMT-1 or EMT-
P shall received special pay of three percent of regular pay, and this EMT bonus shall be calculated on 
regular pay which includes Hazmat, Urban Search and Rescue, Heavy Rescue hazard pay, or Special 
Duty premium pay”. 
2 Article 8.3, Section V(B) of MOU 23 provides “All members of this Unit shall be assigned 
the responsibility as acting as primary responders to emergency medical 
incidents….Effective July 1, 2003, each employee of this bargaining unit (with the exception 
of Firefighter I’s and II’s, ….who are certified as an EMT-1 or EMT-P shall receive special 
pay of $81 biweekly…[increasing to] $86 biweekly effective July 1, 2005”. 
3  Article 8.6 sets out criteria for educational bonuses that are either 1 or 3 percent depending 
upon educational units completed and years of LAFD uniformed service.  This bonus is 
calculated on regular pay plus any special pay for Hazmat, Urban Search and Rescue, and 
Heavy Rescue hazard pay or other Special Duty premium pay. 
4 MOU 23, Appendix A sets out compensation for longevity of service—effective July 1, 
2005, firefighters with more than 15 years but less than 20 years of service receive additional 
compensation of $149.60 biweekly.  
5   Uniform allowance is set in MOU 23 at $28.25 biweekly. 
 
Firefighter “A” Biweekly Pay 
 
Classification: Firefighter III – Salary Step 6 (Schedule 4A)   $3,120.00 
  Biweekly EMT Bonus1         $  86.00 
3% EMT Bonus2              93.60 
  Fire Education Bonus Level 13          31.20 
  Longevity 15 Years Fire4          149.60 
  Uniform Allowance5            28.25 
   Total Amount of Permanent Bonuses        $  388.65 
Total Regular Biweekly Pay       $3,508.65 
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MOU 23 sets out labor provisions for firefighters and fire captains.  Compensation 
factors for this group of nearly 3,500 city employees are fairly complex and include a 
variety of pay provisions to recognize special assignments and qualifications including 
helicopter, fireboat, Urban Search and Rescue, hazardous materials, and paramedic and 
ambulance.  As illustrated in the above example, determination of a firefighter’s biweekly 
compensation begins with the appropriate salary schedule and step and other elements of 
special pay, permanent bonuses, and allowances are added to that base.  In addition to 
bonuses or premium pay directly related to assignments and special qualifications, 
firefighters may also qualify for language and longevity (tenure of service) bonuses.   
 
While not all city employees are eligible for such a broad range of compensation 
differentials as firefighters or law enforcement officers, many premiums and bonuses are 
negotiated with employees of the 40 different bargaining units.  The example of pay for 
Firefighter A is intended to illustrate the complexity of determining just the base or 
regular pay for each category of employee and the potential range of cost implications 
associated with each pay differential.  Moreover, the implications of various salary 
provisions are further complicated when considering the impact to overtime and pension 
costs of many of these elements.   
 
City Controller’s New Payroll System Can Provide Valuable Data 
 
In November 2004, the City Controller implemented a new payroll and personnel system, 
known as PaySR.  Once fully operational, this system, unlike the legacy system discussed 
earlier in this section of this report, will provide a vast amount of data related to various 
aspects of personnel management including the elements needed to appropriately 
estimate and budget for benefits negotiated during the collective bargaining processes.  
As of March 2006, we understand that PaySR includes most of the basic data relative to 
city employees (excluding those employees of the Department of Water and Power); its 
data base includes three years of detail for certain departments, such as the Los Angeles 
Fire Department, and three years of basic payroll data for most others.   
 
Currently, City Controller staff are working to input the detail and build out the full 
functionality that will identify each individual permanent bonus or premium pay item as 
well as allow the real-time generation of management reports keyed many elements of 
data originating from timesheets and Form 41 (employee personal action documents).  
Moreover, the system has the functionality to generate reports for a specific time period, 
allowing historical analysis and estimate-to-actual reviews.  Even with the system not 
fully implemented, a vast amount of invaluable data is available; the system appears user 
friendly and intuitive and reports can be easily converted to Excel spreadsheets for data 
manipulation and analysis as we have done for this analysis. 
 
Using the PaySR extractor component, the City Controller staff generated a number of 
reports relative to wage and compensation components.  These reports reflect the 
profound cost implications of permanent bonuses and overtime to the City’s salary 
expenditures.  As shown in Table B, over the past five calendar years, the number of 
individual permanent bonuses that city employees (not including employees of the 
Department of Water and Power) received rose from 11,383 to 52,272, a greater than 
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four-fold increase.  During that same period, the number of employees working for the 
City remained fairly stable, increasing approximately 2.8 percent from 34,932 to 35,896.  
 
 Table B. Growth of LA City Employees and Number of Permanent Bonuses Paid 
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Data obtained from the Los Angeles City Controller’s Office 
 
The costs related to these permanent bonuses are significant.  In calendar year 2001, the 
City Controller reports reveal that the City spent nearly $27.7 million on permanent 
bonuses amounting to approximately $793 per year for each employee receiving 
permanent bonus compensation. As shown in Table C, over the next four years, the 
annual amount of bonus per employee increased over four-fold or 310 percent—totaling 
about $3,264 per year; however, the number of employees receiving these bonuses also 
increased, boosting the total costs of permanent bonuses to over $117 million in calendar 
year 2005.   
 Table C.  Costs of Permanent Bonuses-Calendar Years 2001-2005 
 
   Data obtained from the Los Angeles City Controller’s Office 
In the 2001 calendar year, City Controller data indicates that the number of permanent 
bonus payments for civilian and security employees (groups excluding sworn fire and 
police, and employees of Department of Water and Power) totaled 2,585; by 2005 the 
number of bonus payments to this group of employees rose to 11,455 comprising about 
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22 percent – yet they earned approximately 27 percent of all permanent bonuses paid 
out—$32.351 million of the total $117,189,106.   
Table D.  Total Costs of Permanent Bonuses—Police 2001-2005 
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           Data obtained from the Los Angeles City Controller’s Office 
 
 
  Table E.  Average of Permanent Bonus Per Police Officer 2001-2005 
 
   Data obtained from the Los Angeles City Controller’s Office 
 
In addition, during 2001, the City paid permanent bonuses relative to sworn police of 
$16,423,728 to $10,196 individuals, equating to about $1,610.80 per person annually.  
For the 2005 calendar year, although the number of officers remained fairly stable at 
$10,205 the total amount of permanent bonuses paid to sworn police swelled to 
$49,950,286 and the amount per employee increased to $4,502.70.  Tables D and E 
illustrate the growth in total amounts paid to sworn police during the past five calendar 
years.  In Tables F and G, we present similar data for firefighters.  Similar to the police 
force the number of firefighter has remained fairly stable over the last five years, but the 
average amount of permanent bonus per firefighter has significantly increased.  
Specifically, in 2001, 3,241 firefighters averaged about $892 per year in permanent 
bonuses.  In 2005, 3,562 firefighters averaged bonuses rose to $9,776.  As illustrated in 
the two tables, the total costs of negotiated permanent bonuses for police and fire have 
increased—police costs have risen nearly 180 percent from 2001 while firefighter costs 
have increased nearly 11 fold or about 1093 percent. 
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 Table F.  Total Costs of Permanent Bonuses—Fire 2001-2005 
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    Data obtained from the Los Angeles City Controller’s Office 
 
 
 Table G.  Average of Permanent Bonus Per Firefighter 2001-2005 
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  Data obtained from the Los Angeles City Controller’s Office 
 
The City Controller’s staff are currently converting historic data for many departments 
and MOUs that will enable the CAO and City Controller access to “unbundled” bonus 
data for financial management purposes.  Although the conversion is still in progress, 
more detail is already available than before.  Currently, PaySR allows users access to 
“read only” data that can be identified and sorted to easily create custom reports.  
 
Reports prepared by the City Controller reveal that, thus far in the conversion process 
from the Legacy system to PaySR, more than 150 bonus categories have been created to 
support the unbundling of the permanent bonuses.  Some categories are generic, such as 
“Uniforms”, and can be used to code uniform allowances across MOUs and departments.  
In fact, for the 2005 calendar year, 8,211 City employees received uniform allowances 
costing a total of $5,768,288.80 or an average of $702.51 per employee per year. Other 
categories require unique identifiers and may relate to a single job classification, for 
instance, the City police permanent bonus classification, “K9 Handler Narcotics 
Division.”  To further illustrate, the City Controller’s report reflects 65 codes for 
firefighter’s bonuses—11 of these bonuses apply to a single individual.  Similarly, 32 
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bonus categories relate to the City police and seven of these apply to fewer than five 
people.   
 
In addition to the data presented in the tables earlier in this section, we worked alongside 
City Controller staff to create, on a real-time basis, a number of statistical and 
management data reports to allow us to understand the fiscal implications of permanent 
and temporary bonuses.  For example, we discovered that within MOU 2, Los Angeles 
World Airports paid six painters and four plumbers shift differentials during the first 
biweekly pay period in September 2005 and nine electricians assigned to the Wastewater 
Collection System received shift differentials and/or permanent bonuses for obnoxious 
conditions.  In relation to MOU 3, data reveals that 17 messenger clerks at the Library 
Department received a biweekly language bonus of $32 for a March pay period whereas 
31 clerk typists at that department earned language bonuses ranging from $37.50 to 
$41.60 during that period, and the total for all MOU 3 biweekly language bonuses for 
that period equaled $4,161.60.  The reports we generated showed over 40 departments 
are represented under MOU 3 and that employees within that bargaining unit earn nearly 
$270,000 per pay period in permanent bonuses. 
 
We believe that the preceding examples demonstrate that utilizing the full range of 
PaySR functionality offers a great breadth and depth of data that will enable negotiators 
and other decision makers invaluable data for determining the costs of past contract 
provisions and for estimating and projecting proposed contractual agreements. 
 
Overtime Costs Pose Another Significant Wage and Salary Cost 
 
In the past, decision makers estimated overtime using general historic data; it was 
difficult to consolidate figures between departments and across job categories.  
Nonetheless, the cost of overtime pay is significant, especially given the fact that most is 
paid at a time-and-a-half basis.  As discussed earlier in this section, permanent bonuses 
may be included in the basis for determining overtime pay rates.  Consequently, 
providing decision makers with as much detail of estimating the impacts of overtime on 
salary and bonus increases will prove invaluable for budgetary purposes.  Working 
alongside City Controller staff, we developed reports to estimate the costs of overtime 
for one biweekly pay period for several MOU units.   
 
Under the PaySR timekeeping system, we were able to identify each employee recording 
an overtime transaction.  Four types of transactions may take place: overtime earned and 
paid out that pay period at 1.5 times pay; overtime earned and paid out that pay period at 
straight time; overtime earned at 1.5 times of pay and banked for future use or payout; 
and overtime banked either paid out or used.  As an example, MOU 18 represents 
approximately 1,460 employees in a variety of departments.  During one biweekly pay 
period in September 2005, unit employees logged 21,561.5 overtime hours and the City 
paid out $697,731.20 in overtime payments. Because data from PaySR may be exported 
into Excel software, users may easily sort this data to identify multiple entries for one 
employee, determine total amounts per department, or to find out how much overtime 
was paid to Security Officers at the Airport, for instance (8,484.7 hours of overtime at a 
cost of $277,118.40 for 246 employees). 
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To provide some context of the cost of overtime, we worked with City Controller’s staff 
to extract reports for six sample MOUs for units 1, 3, 4, 18, 23 and 37.  These reports 
reflected payroll data for one biweekly pay period in September 2005.  Table H provides 
the results for these bargaining units. 
 Table H.  Overtime Statistics for 6 Bargaining Units— 
 One Biweekly September 2005 Pay Period  
 
MOU  
Unit 
Name of Group Represented Approximate 
Number of 
Employees 
Represented 
by MOU 
Number of 
Overtime 
Hours Charged 
in the 
Biweekly 
Period 
Total Amount of 
Overtime Paid 
Out in the Pay 
Period 
1 Administrative Unit 2,340 4,420.1 $157,766.13 
3 Clerical and Support Services 4,616 16,148.0 $480,250.50 
4 Equipment Operation & Labor Employees 3,633 23,159.9 $744,246.70 
18 Safety and Security Employees 1,458 21,561.5 $697,731.20 
23 Firefighters and Fire Captains 3,431 97,371.3 $3,363,788.45 
37 Executive Administrative Assistants 114 99.6 $2,891.63 
 Data provided by the City Controller. 
 
We did not determine whether the pay period selected for our review is indicative of 
annual overtime payments for these six units; rather, this data is presented to illustrate 
the significance of costs related to overtime payments and the need to consider the 
implications of wage and compensation agreements on overtime costs.  Certainly not 
every employee within each of the six units earned overtime during the single pay period 
and many may not accrue overtime at all during a year.  Nonetheless, we believe the 
PaySR system should be used to provide labor negotiators, EERC and the City Council 
with a complete picture of the cost implications of the various COLA, permanent and 
temporary bonuses, and other premium pay being considered.  This will assure that the 
final decision is based on the most complete and accurate cost estimates possible at that 
time. 
 
Clearer MOU Language Will Reduce City Controller Payroll Costs 
 
Currently, the City Controller’s Office implements the salary, premium pay and 
permanent bonus terms and conditions of MOUs after they are approved by the City 
Council.  Since each of the 40 MOUs contains uniquely negotiated terms, the process to 
modify the Controller’s payroll system to assure that City employees receive the pay and 
bonuses that they are qualified for is a significant effort – in many cases involving re-
programming the system to identify, and pay, those eligible. 
 
The staff resources and programming effort involved is exacerbated by the inconsistent, 
complex and sometimes ambiguous terms negotiated between the City and the labor 
union in many MOUs.  When the MOU language is vague or imprecise, the City 
Controller incurs unnecessary costs to interpret, administer and implement the MOU’s 
terms and conditions. 
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                 Imprecise MOU Language  
We were told by management in the Controller payroll unit that imprecise or vague 
MOU language, or the absence of needed language, caused inefficiencies in identifying, 
calculating and paying employee’s their negotiated bonuses and premium payments.  
These include: 
• Determining how to pay employees who accrete (transfer) from one bargaining unit 
to another, since no MOU instructions exist concerning this issue. 
• Dealing with differing interpretations of the units of measure used to pay bonuses or 
premiums, such as a workday, pay period, term of service, etc.  Because these “units” 
are not defined in the MOUs, they are subject to varied interpretations even among 
CAO negotiators. 
• Determining which special payments or bonuses are taxable, should have tax 
withheld, and are includable in W-2s and which are not.  Some MOU language 
alludes to payments being non-taxable, while others state the bonuses are taxable.  
For example, bi-weekly uniform allowances have taxes withheld, although annual 
uniform allowances do not (but they are reported on the employee’s W-2).  
• Assessing when to pay a special payment or bonus if the exact date for payment is 
not included in the MOU.  For example, the MOU may give a month, but not a 
specific day of the month (e.g. first or last day). 
• Identifying which group of employees is to receive a special provision, such as a bi-
weekly uniform allowance.  Current MOUs do not specify the employees by class 
codes, titles or provide exceptions, requiring clarification discussions between the 
CAO and Controller. 
• Assuring that union deductions and agency fees are accurate when no specific 
deduction amount or computation method is included in the MOU.  
Overly Complex MOU Language                  
Moreover, MOUs also include complex terms or conditions that cause the Controller’s 
Office to expend additional time and effort implementing contract provisions (e.g. 
manual processing or system re-programming).  These complexities include: 
• Determining when and how to compound the various bonuses for employees who 
receive multiple bonuses.  For example, some bonuses are a percentage derivative of 
base salary, some are compounded upon other bonuses and some are a percentage of 
cumulative bonuses.  This often requires system re-programming and obtaining CAO 
interpretations and clarifications. 
• Addressing the complexity of rules governing what percentage of a bonus is 
pensionable versus non-pensionable. For example, in one MOU the first 2 percent of 
a 5.5 percent bonus is subject to pension calculation, while the remaining 3.5 percent 
is not.   
• Identifying what part of a bonus is temporary and which part is permanent is 
complex because MOUs sometimes split bonuses between the two.  For example, on 
a given 5 percent bonus, the MOU provides that one-half is temporary and one-half is 
permanent.  This requires that department payroll offices manually maintain the 
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temporary bonus on each affected employee’s time records.  The permanent portion 
is managed by the Controller as a permanent bonus subject to retirement provisions. 
• Continually adding new bonus codes in MOUs has created a potential system 
limitation since the Controller is running out of codes.  Payroll system enhancements 
will be needed if the City continues to negotiate new bonuses. 
• Implementing retroactive bonuses when MOUs are approved beyond the calendar 
year in which they are effective  Because they impact a prior tax year, the Controller 
must manually process certain portions due to system design limitations. 
 
All of these issues suggest a need for the City to consider some standardization of the 
terms and conditions it employs across all 40 MOUs it negotiates to assure that the final 
agreements can be efficiently and effectively managed by the City Controller and 
departmental payroll personnel.  Additionally, the CAO and Controller’s Office would 
benefit from more close coordination during the MOU negotiation process to identify 
provisions being considered that are potentially costly to administer.  
 
Comparing Salaries for City Positions with Similar Private and Public 
Sector Jobs Adds Perspective 
 
As discussed in Section I of the report, Los Angeles City employees are among the 
highest paid public sector workers in the region and nationally.  Additionally, the robust 
retirement and health plans that Los Angeles City employees enjoy are significant 
benefits not seen in many comparable jobs.  Information on the comparison of City 
salaries against similar public and private sector wages within the Los Angeles Region 
would provide decision makers with additional insights during deliberations. 
 
For illustrative purposes only, we have identified the salaries (excluding retirement and 
health benefits) for a small sample of six common City positions from 2001 through 
2005 and compared them with salaries for similar positions gathered for the Los Angeles 
Region by the California Employment Development Department (EDD).  The six 
positions are: 
1. Accounting Clerk/Bookkeeper 
2. Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning Mechanic 
3. Security Officer 
4. Executive Secretary 
5. Clerk 
6. Construction and Maintenance Laborer 
The selected City salaries have maintained a favorable advantage over comparable 
private sector salaries during the entire five-year period reviewed. The range between 
salaries is most pronounced in the Security Guard classification where in 2005 it was 
72.1 percent higher than comparable EDD salary data, and is closest in the Construction 
and Maintenance Laborer classification with a 25.7 percent advantage in 2005.  Graphs 
for each position salary comparison are presented in the following pages.   
 41
 
Bookeepers/Accounting Clerks
$44,882.00
$42,329.00
$41,071.00
$39,495.00
$44,026.00
$33,740.00
$32,491.00$32,251.00$32,303.00
$33,153.00
$0.00
$5,000.00
$10,000.00
$15,000.00
$20,000.00
$25,000.00
$30,000.00
$35,000.00
$40,000.00
$45,000.00
$50,000.00
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Sa
la
ry LA City
LA Region per EDD
 
 
 
HVAC Mechanic
$54,336.00
$56,524.00
$58,800.00
$61,171.00 $61,171.00
$42,896.00
$45,469.00
$43,797.00$42,817.00
$40,136.00
$0.00
$10,000.00
$20,000.00
$30,000.00
$40,000.00
$50,000.00
$60,000.00
$70,000.00
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Sa
la
ry LA City
LA Region per EDD
 
 42
Security Officers
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
We believe that City decision makers negotiating multi-million dollar collective 
bargaining agreements should have as much information as possible to assist them 
during deliberations.  The CAO currently provides a great deal of this critical fiscal 
impact information and with the evolution of the Controller’s PaySR system, more detail 
and specificity is now available to expand this data.  This should also allow more 
comparisons of benefits offered in past MOUs to those currently being negotiated, 
distinguishing the types of bonuses being offered and their impacts, and identifying the 
fiscal implications of overtime rates.  Furthermore, by crafting the MOU language more 
precisely and consistently, and obtaining input from the Controller’s Office, the City can 
benefit from lowering the administrative costs inherent to managing the MOUs once they 
are ratified.  Finally, providing the overall perspective of comparing City salaries to 
similar positions in the public and private sector for the Los Angeles Region should 
assist City decision makers by affording them comparative salary data to consider during 
negotiations. 
 
Recommendations 
The Mayor and City Council should consider the following actions during their labor 
negotiations: 
• Utilize the functionality of PaySR to identify and unbundle permanent and temporary 
bonuses to create analyses to build full compensation models for job classifications 
and compare them to prior MOU agreements, and determine their fiscal impact 
including retirement and other benefits they may generate. 
• Clarify which bonuses should be added to base pay and be subject to pension benefits 
and future COLAs and which should not. 
• Analyze compensation provisions from a broader, multi-year basis rather than on an 
incremental, add-on to existing MOU terms. 
• Determine the accuracy of MOU fiscal projections and estimates by conducting 
periodic “budget to actual” comparisons during the term of the contracts. 
• Assess the impact of departmental overtime charges under typical MOU salary and 
bonus terms and conditions using historic data during negotiations. 
• Obtain benchmark private and public sector comparative salary data for the Los 
Angeles Region for the positions covered by the MOU during negotiations. 
• Establish common MOU language for similar bonus and premium pay categories 
with input from the Controller’s Office to ease in the interpretation and 
implementation of agreed upon terms.  Ensure MOU provisions include a clear 
description of the unit of measure (e.g. specific pay period or hours) used. 
• Assure that MOUs contain a clear outline of qualifying conditions for bonuses, 
allowances and other pay premiums that specify the job classification and criteria 
needed to receive the benefit, and a specific date when the payment should be 
received. 
• Clarify which bonuses or pay premiums are subject to tax withholding and inclusion 
on the employee’s W-2. 
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Section III:  Additional Ideas for Consideration 
 
It is a challenging time for those engaged in the labor negotiations process in the City of 
Los Angeles.  The fiscal concerns expressed by many city officials, the pressure exerted 
on union leadership from rank and file members to replicate the contract negotiated by 
the Department of Water and Power with the IBEW in 2005, and extensive and 
impassioned press coverage are contributing factors.  In addition, there is not a great deal 
of flexibility, as salaries and benefits make up nearly 70 percent of the city’s annual $4 
billion general fund budget.20 
 
This is occurring while Los Angeles is also working at reducing crime and addressing 
such significant issues as education, transportation, affordable housing, gangs, poverty, 
pollution, an aging infrastructure, and the worst homeless problem in the nation.  
According to a recent study by the city-commissioned Los Angeles Economy Project, 
there is also a widening gap between high-wage and low-wage jobs.  Job growth in Los 
Angeles has been weak compared with the state and the rest of the country, and has been 
concentrated in the western and northern parts of the city.21 
 
A city and its unions have a symbiotic relationship.  The people who work for the city 
create a tableau on which the rest of the city’s political, social and economic activity 
takes place.  How effectively and efficiently city services are performed greatly 
influences the amount businesses are willing to invest in the city, as well as the ability of 
the city to attract residents and tourists.  When city services are poor, or so expensively 
delivered that the economic health of the city is endangered, an escalation of loss and 
negative, reinforcing consequences often occurs.22  Most of us have visited or lived in 
cities where this has happened.  
 
This Section outlines a variety of strategies, including promising practices from other 
parts of the country, that should be considered to improve the likelihood that labor and 
management can move forward together to build a better future for the City of Los 
Angeles.  
 
It is a positive sign and important to note that in our discussions with both city and union 
leaders, there were very few individuals who disagreed with the ideas presented here.  
Some expressed understandable skepticism that all of those involved would be willing or 
able to put aside history, be able to follow through given all of the competing demands 
for their time and attention, and/or risk alienating key constituents by doing what is right 
for the city (and, ultimately, for their constituents).  We understand these obstacles, and 
others, very well.  Over the last three decades we have worked with hundreds of 
organizations and have repeatedly witnessed how labor and management have either been 
able to work together to overcome serious challenges and achieve significant results, or 
failed to work together and hurt themselves and those they represent.  In Los Angeles in 
                                                 
20 Barrett, Beth.  “L.A. Must Get Lean.  Mayor Vows to Cut City Budget Deficit.”  Daily News (Los  
  Angeles).  March 6, 2006. 
21 Cleeland, Nancy.  “L.A. Group Strives to Build a Better Workforce.”  Los Angeles Times.  February 26, 
2006. 
22 Senge, Peter.  The Fifth Discipline.  (revised ed.)  New York: Doubleday, 2006.  This is a clear 
exposition of systems thinking, where these types of dynamics are described in detail. 
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2006, an historic opportunity is available if the parties involved are willing to work 
together. 
 
Key Factors Impacting Labor Relations and Negotiations in Los 
Angeles 
 
It became clear as we were conducting this study that, in addition to examining the labor 
negotiations process itself (discussed in Section I), seven underlying issues that impact 
labor relations and negotiations in Los Angeles also needed to be addressed.  These 
issues are: 
1. The Efficiency and Effectiveness of L.A. City Government Services and   
Operations 
2. Skepticism among Many City Union Leaders About the City’s Assertion that 
there is a Serious Fiscal Crisis Looming 
3. The Impact of the 2005 Department of Water and Power/IBEW Contract on the 
Expectations of Many of the Other Unions’ Rank and File Members 
4. A Looming Succession Planning Crisis  
5. The Absence of a City-Wide Strategic Plan for Los Angeles Reflecting the 
Involvement of all City Stakeholders, Including the Unions 
6. The Lack of a Coordinated Economic Development Effort 
7. An Under-utilization of the Potential Demonstrated by Previous Efforts of 
Labor-Management Committees in the City 
In this Section, we discuss each of the factors and then provide recommendations to 
address the challenges they pose. 
 
1. Los Angeles city government could deliver services more 
efficiently and effectively. 
 
While most organizations could benefit from an analysis of what could be done more 
efficiently and effectively, it is evident that the City of Los Angeles has many areas that 
could benefit from this type of activity.  Most of the managers we interviewed readily 
admitted they would welcome help in this area, and the labor leaders agreed there were 
many opportunities to achieve efficiencies.  For example, SEIU Local 347 has developed 
several documents outlining their ideas as well as summaries that are available on their 
website, www.seiu347.org.23 
 
                                                 
23 SEIU Local 347 Press Release.  “LA City Workers Submit Recommendations Worth $58.31 Million in 
Savings, $38.3 Million in Additional Revenue, and Enhancements and Improvements in Municipal 
Services for the City’s 2005-06 Fiscal Year Budget.”  April 15, 2005. 
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In addition, the mayor has called for a rigorous examination of how revenues can be 
enhanced and efficiencies achieved.  He recently announced the establishment of a 
Mayor’s Performance Unit, modeled after a program developed in Britain.24 
 
While performance issues do exist and should be addressed, it is important to point out 
that we repeatedly heard from both labor and management that the hiring freezes that 
have been implemented in the past have also significantly affected the ability of 
managers to operate departments effectively.  (These hiring freezes have come about 
partly as a result of the “boom or bust” style of previous negotiations.  This has involved 
awarding larger wage settlements when fiscal conditions appear to be good, and then 
resorting to layoffs, hiring freezes and smaller or no raises when economic conditions are 
more difficult.) It is important to break this cycle, and to link more effective work 
operations with more consistent negotiations and hiring plans.  The effect of the hiring 
freezes on succession planning has also been significant, and will be discussed below. 
 
2. Many city union leaders are skeptical about the city’s assertion 
that there is a serious fiscal crisis looming. 
 
The Mayor and CAO have stated that there is an ongoing structural budget deficit that is 
being exacerbated by expanded hiring, expensive health care and pension costs, and 
compliance with the $110 million LAPD/Ramparts Consent Decree.  Budget deficit 
projections, currently estimated at $287 million, could rise to $450 million by 2010, 
assuming there is no catastrophic event or recession.  The continued use of “one shot 
gimmicks” is being discouraged, and fiscal restraint is being urged.25  Most of the city 
union leaders we spoke with, however, do not believe this crisis is real.  They point to the 
city’s history of surpluses, even in years when they bargained in good faith and their 
members took little or no raises because of a previously predicted fiscal crisis that they 
felt often failed to materialize.   
 
3. The impact of the 2005 Department of Water and Power/IBEW 
MOU on the expectations of many of the other unions’ rank and file 
members has been substantial. 
 
Pressure to strike or conduct other job actions will likely increase as MOUs expire or 
near expiration.  The discontent of many of the non-IBEW union members is exacerbated 
by the knowledge that, in addition to smaller pay increases, their salaries are often lower 
than DWP salaries for the same work.    In addition, for many years the IBEW contracts 
have generally provided even better retirement and health benefits than those received by 
other city unions.  That the DWP, the nation’s largest public utility, is an authority with 
revenues generated from ratepayers and not a city agency has not made much of an 
impact on most workers’ feelings towards the contractual differences.  The last set of 
negotiations yielded these results:26  
 
                                                 
24 “Accelerating our Ambitions,” an address by Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa on the State of the City of Los 
Angeles.  April 18, 2006. 
25 “Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Mayor Villaraigosa Regarding City of Los Angeles’ $295 Million 
‘Inherited’ Deficit.”  March 1, 2006. 
26 City of Los Angeles, CAO’s Office.  March 2006. 
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Terms of Latest Police and Fire Contracts 
7/1/03 - 6/30/06 
Contract Term Salary Increase 
7/1/03—6/30/04 2.00% 
  7/1/04—06/30/05 3.00% 
  7/1/05—06/30/06 4.00% 
 
 
 
 
 
An analysis of two previous IBEW contracts shows that the 2005 contract was simply a 
continuation of the types of terms negotiated with the IBEW in previous MOUs.  For 
example, in the 2002-2005 MOU, the cost of living was also pegged to the Consumer 
Price Index; only the minimum was set at 5 percent with a cap of 6 percent, depending on 
that year’s CPI.28  (This meant even if the CPI was down in the 2 percent range, the 
IBEW would get 5 percent.  However, if the CPI grew to 9 percent, the IBEW would 
receive 6 percent).  There was an extension in place from 2000 to 2002, as a result of the 
1998 Staff Reduction Program.  In the 1996-99 IBEW MOU, the cost of living increase 
was pegged to the CPI, with a minimum of 2½ percent and a cap of 5 percent, depending 
on the year’s CPI.  From the perspective of the IBEW in 2005, they did not believe 
following the pattern of bargaining they had established with the city in recent years was 
                                                 
27 This language was somewhat ambiguous, and has subsequently been interpreted to mean, for example, 
that if the CPI is 4 percent, the IBEW members will receive raises of 4 percent. 
28 In 1996, the DWP negotiated the use of the national CPI-U figures for their MOUs with the IBEW.  
When the CAO reports numbers to the EERC and for budget purposes, the CAO uses the Southern 
California CPI-U.   
Terms of Latest Contracts for All AFSCME and SEIU Bargaining Units 
7/1/04 - 6/30/07 
Contract Term Salary Increase 
7/1/04—6/30/05 0% 
7/1/05—6/30/06 2.00% 
7/1/06—12/31/06 2.00% 
1/1/07 to 6/30/07 2.25% 
Terms of Latest IBEW Contract 
10/1/05—9/30/10 
Contract Term Salary Increase 
10/1/05—9/30/06 
10/1/06—9/30/07 
10/1/07—9/30/08 
10/1/08—9/30/09 
10/1/09—9/30/10 
IBEW salaries will increase by the same percentage as the 
CPI for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers for U.S. 
city average.  (If the CPI increase is 3.25 percent or less, 
salaries for IBEW workers will increase by 3.25 percent.  If 
the CPI increase is 6 percent or more, the salary ranges will 
increase by 6 percent.)27 
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unreasonable.  (In fact, they felt that they were showing restraint, especially because they 
believed management had no plan in event of a strike.  They were subsequently surprised 
by the deep, negative reaction to the results of the 2005 negotiations.)    
 
The tension is also fueled by the very common differences in salaries.  While there are 
positions in the DWP that require higher levels of skill and are in greater demand in the 
marketplace (there are 118 classifications unique to the DWP29), there are also many 
positions that have substantial inequities in pay for those doing similar or 
identical/equivalent work in other agencies.  In some instances, DWP workers receive up 
to 40 percent more money for performing the same tasks.  Position announcements for 
vacancies call attention to these discrepancies on a regular basis.  For example, the salary 
for a Workers’ Compensation Analyst is posted at $49,151 to $61,053 for the position in 
all city agencies.  The salary for the position at DWP, listed on the same announcement, 
is $61,324 to $76,212.  The salary for an Operations and Statistical Research Analyst for 
city agencies is $60,364 to $75,000 and $72,098 to $89,596.  The salary in the DWP is 
$81,077 to $118,535.  Of the 130 common classifications provided by the Personnel 
Department, DWP had higher salaries for all but two of the positions.  Clerks at the top 
salary steps receive 14.51 percent more at DWP, Custodial Services Attendants receive 
26.25 percent more, and Automotive Dispatchers receive 40.70 percent more.  SEIU 
Local 347 analyzed budget data and found that 99 percent of the DWP salaries for shared 
job classifications are more than the same job class for other City of Los Angeles 
Departments.  The average difference was 18.56 percent, with a range of less than 1 
percent to 40.79 percent.30  This discrepancy has not only led to a great deal of 
resentment, but also to at least 615 employees receiving transfers or promotions since 
2001.  It was not possible to obtain reliable information on how many city employees 
resigned to take positions at DWP, as the city’s and DWP’s payroll systems are not 
currently linked and cannot produce a clean data set, but estimates are that there are also 
a substantial number of these.31   
 
Almost all of the managers we have interviewed have said that, at times, transfers and 
resignations in order to take jobs at DWP have had a significantly disruptive influence on 
managing the workforce.  In many cases, they have lost some of their very best 
employees.  One City Councilmember likened this “two tiered workforce” to a system 
that “gives one child a Cadillac and the other an Edsel.”  In addition, the City Civil 
Service Commission, in a letter last year to the City Council, requested that “the City 
Council take steps to reduce or eliminate the disparities that exist,” and that “most city 
classes that are used in both the DWP and other departments are paid considerably more 
in the DWP.”32 
 
The feelings of injustice have also been heightened by the many high-visibility press 
reports over the years of waste and poor decision making at the highest levels of the 
Department of Water and Power, totaling many millions of dollars.  New managers and 
                                                 
29 City of Los Angeles, Personnel Department.  March 2006. 
30 SEIU, Local 347.  “Salary Differences Per Class Code Between DWP and other City of Los Angeles 
Departments.”  November 21, 2005. 
31 City of Los Angeles, Personnel Department.  March 2006.  The Personnel Department was able to obtain 
an approximate number of transfers and promotions by running an Extractor Report from PaySR, 
although they acknowledge the 615 figure is likely to be underreported for a variety of reasons. 
32 Civil Service Commission correspondence to the Los Angeles City Council.  February 18, 2005. 
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board members have recently been appointed, and efforts are being made to correct 
matters.  This has done little to reduce the resentment over the discrepancies in salaries 
and wages.  Nor does the knowledge that city workers are among the highest paid public 
sector workers in the county (and the country) seem to matter.  Those occupying many of 
the lower paying positions face their own economic challenges, including the high cost of 
living in the Los Angeles area.  And asking those employees in the higher paying 
positions to take a broader perspective and compare their economic situation to those in 
the private sector struggling with lower pay and few, if any, health and retirement 
benefits is not likely to prove effective, judging from our previous observations of similar 
situations in other parts of the country.  (See Section II of this report for a comparison of 
a sample of private sector to city salaries.) 
 
It appears, from conversations with union leaders (and from the results of member 
surveys), that members of many of the other unions want parity with the IBEW and are 
placing a great deal of pressure on their leadership to deliver contracts with comparable 
raises.  (A recent exception to this was the ratification of the contract with the Police 
Protective League, which provides raises totaling 10.25% over the next three years.)  
Given the expectations these union members have, there is a danger that the tensions 
resulting from future negotiations will result in the loss of some very effective, 
intelligent, and creative union leaders (who have demonstrated in the recent past that they 
care about the city as well as their members) as the rank and file select more 
confrontational and narrowly-focused leadership.  This has occurred in many other 
jurisdictions, often with negative results.  A continually dissatisfied workforce, spurred 
on by angry union leadership, is not likely to be as productive, creative or focused on 
providing quality service or helping to solve the city’s problems.  In addition, an 
escalation of tensions and resulting job actions over even minor events become more 
possible.  A dramatic and well-documented example of this occurred in the private sector 
at the United Airlines maintenance center near Indianapolis.  Long celebrated as an 
excellent example of labor and management working together to achieve outstanding 
results, the militant factions of the union led a work slowdown, triggered by 
management’s abrupt cancellation of an inordinate amount of leave on a 4th of July 
weekend, which resulted in the consequent closing of the center in 2003.33  
 
4. As in all levels of government, a succession planning crisis is 
looming and needs to be addressed. 
 
The aging out of “baby boomers” from the workforce will soon be creating a serious 
problem at every level of government.  (While the problem also exists in the private 
sector, it is more acute in the public sector because tight budgets, beginning in the 1980’s, 
restricted new hiring.  In addition, many public sector workers are staying in their jobs 
longer.)  Forty-two percent of those working in state and local government in the United 
States in 1999 were between the ages of 45 and 64.34  Los Angeles will also be feeling 
the effects.  For example, more than 1,600 police officers and firefighters will be required 
to retire over the next five years, including 264 of the most seasoned detectives, as a 
                                                 
33 Uchitelle, Louis.  The Disposable American:  Layoffs and Their Consequences.  New York: Knopf, 
2006. 
34 Pynes, Joan E.  “The Implications of Workforce and Succession Planning in the Public Sector.”  Public 
Personnel Management.  January 2004. 
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result of a deferred retirement program.  (The program was designed to give the LAPD 
time to fill veteran’s slots but budget constraints and difficulties in recruiting prevented 
the expansion of staff.)35  
 
The problem in Los Angeles is widespread.  According to the Valuation Results of the 
Los Angeles City Employees’ Retirement System, the average age of the members 
enrolled in the system is 45.6.  Over 5,000 of those employees are currently over 55.36  
Recently, concerned DWP Commissioners asked the agency’s managers to address 
succession planning, training and recruitment issues, as roughly 40 percent of the 
agency’s employees will be eligible to retire in five years.37 In addition, many of the most 
experienced city negotiators have either retired or will be retiring soon. 
 
We have observed that the general public, appointed and elected officials often 
underestimate the complexity of government work, and that many of those positions with 
upcoming vacancies will need to be filled by a “bench” of workers with experience and 
very specific knowledge that is currently non-existent.  The two-tiered wage and benefits 
system also encourages workers to transfer to DWP in their last years in order to take 
advantage of the better pay and benefits.  In addition, this crisis in succession planning 
will mean that, more than ever, Los Angeles will need the very best efforts from those 
employees who will be left behind. 
 
Term limits have led to some of the same problems for elected officials.  The complexity 
of the issues and the work has often meant that just as elected officials are beginning to 
become comfortable with the very steep learning curve, they are required to move on.  
Former Maine Governor Angus King, who supported term limits and now wants them 
repealed, recently stated: “A lot of these issues have to be dealt with in consecutive 
legislatures.  They’re very complex and if you always have to go back to square one, you 
never get anywhere.”38 
 
Almost everyone we interviewed acknowledged that term limits have contributed to 
problems with the labor relations process, as well as to more short-term thinking towards 
public policy in general.  Thad Kousser, a political scientist at the University of 
California at San Diego, summarizes the situation:  “Term limited legislatures are like 
airports.  Someone is always coming, someone is always going, and then there are the 
people who can’t seem to find their way to the ticket counter.”39 
 
                                                 
35 McGreevy, Patrick.  “Retirement Exodus Looming for LAPD.”  Los Angeles Times.  March 24, 2006. 
36 “LACERS Annual Report.”  Los Angeles City Employees Retirement System.  
37 Barrett, Beth.   “L.A.’s City Workers Graying but Staying.”  Daily News (Los Angeles).  April 11, 2006. 
38 Greenblatt, Alan.  "The Truth About Term Limits."  Governing Magazine  January 2006. 
39 Kousser, Thad.  Term Limits and the Dismantling of State Legislatures.  Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005. 
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5. There has not been a substantial, coordinated, city-wide Strategic 
Plan for Los Angeles involving major stakeholders, including the 
unions. 
 
Los Angeles faces some of the most challenging problems of any city in the nation.  It 
was widely acknowledged in the interviews we conducted that, despite many wonderful 
initiatives, the city’s historically piecemeal approach to strategic planning has resulted in 
fragmented development and the lack of a citywide vision and goals. Almost everyone 
we spoke with expressed the need for citywide planning, and agreed that it would be 
valuable to include the unions in that process.  
 
This lack of planning and vision has also been reflected in the negotiating process itself, 
and was discussed in Section I of this study. 
 
6. If no way is found to produce substantial economic development, 
and “expand the pie” through economic development for all of the 
workforce, private and public, tensions will likely increase. 
 
The wage gap between the highest income earners and the lowest is growing in Los 
Angeles, and the city is also lagging behind the rest of the country in job growth.  Much 
has been written in recent years of the loss from Los Angeles of many jobs in aerospace 
and other manufacturing industries that provided benefits and high wages.  It has been 
estimated by Dan Flaming of the Economic Roundtable that more than one million 
skilled workers left Los Angeles County in the 1990’s.  
 
According to the Los Angeles Times, 1.4 million of Los Angeles’ 3.8 million residents 
are “working poor,” a category that would include a family of two adults and two 
children earning $38,000 a year or less.  “Los Angeles epitomizes a kind of urban poverty 
in which the poor-day laborers, hotel workers, taxi drivers and convenience store clerks, 
among others, work two or three jobs and still confront agonizing daily choices about 
whether to put food on the table, have warm clothing or get decent medical care.”40  
 
It is likely Los Angeles will face additional fiscal challenges in the future, as the rise in 
the low wage population, due in part to immigration, will contribute to the need for 
increased government service delivery.  Proposition 13 and the limits on the raising of 
local revenue have resulted in an increasing reliance on bonds to finance new initiatives.  
This has often meant higher debt burdens for those who are able to own their own homes.  
City and county bonds have raised the average city property-tax bill to $1,155 per 
$100,000.41   
 
                                                 
40 Helfand, Duke and Nancy Cleeland.  “Nation’s Mayors Put Spotlight on Poverty.”  Los Angeles Times.  
March 30, 2006. 
41 “Bonds Bonanza.  L.A.’s Mortgaged Future Comes at a Steep Price.” (Editorial)  Daily News (Los 
Angeles).  April 18, 2006. 
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All of these factors may contribute to more contentious labor relations in the future if the 
economy does not grow in a way that can support the needs of the workforce in the 
region, in both the public and private sectors. 
 
7. While there have been some notable joint labor-management 
efforts, labor-management committees in the city have not 
achieved their full potential for a variety of reasons. 
 
There have been some very significant accomplishments by labor-management 
committees in the City.  Joint Labor Management Committees (JLMCs) were officially 
established in 1989.  Citywide JLMCs usually have coalition bargaining authority over 
issues that affect a wide variety of city employees.  For example, a Citywide JLMC 
Benefits Committee that was charged with negotiating a benefit structure for all of the 
unions was widely considered a success.  Other initiatives addressed parking and a 
comprehensive safety plan. 
 
Departmental JLMCs address internal operational or efficiency issues.  The LAPD and 
the Los Angeles Police Protective League have a strong commitment to attempting to 
solve problems together.  SEIU and AFSCME have participated in some well-designed 
and highly successful initiatives with a variety of departments.  Results have included: 
improving procurement processes, eliminating unnecessary laboratory tests, solving the 
problem of unanswered 911 calls due to a shortage of emergency dispatchers, reducing 
the fleet size of the trash collection vehicles, and increasing traffic sign painting, speed 
and productivity through equipment redesign.42  (Citywide reports on the 
accomplishments of the JLMCs are available to September of 2003.  Those compiling the 
reports at the Quality and Productivity Commission were transferred to other departments 
as a result of the 2004 budget.43)  The IBEW has embraced the concept since 1996, and 
has worked closely with UCLA on a variety of initiatives.  Their accomplishments in the 
area of health and safety training have been impressive.  Before the adoption of their joint 
safety program, there were 15,283 lost days for injuries in 1999.  By 2004, injuries had 
been reduced to 6,007 (and a projected 3,500 in 2005), with a decrease in the overall 
severity of the injuries.  Associated labor costs went from $4.4 million in 1999 to $1.8 
million in 2004.  These gains occurred despite the major increase in overtime (a key 
factor in injuries) because there were 2,000 fewer employees in 1998 after the 
implementation of the Strategic Reduction Program.44 
 
In our conversations with managers and union leaders, however, there appeared to be a 
general consensus that the JLMCs in Los Angeles are not currently reaching their full 
potential.  Reasons cited for this include disinterest by one or both parties in some of the 
departments, poor morale, lack of trust, and/or the belief that working in this way is not a 
high priority for a significant number of those in positions of authority.  
 
 
                                                 
42 City of Los Angeles, Quality and Productivity Commission.  Joint Labor Management Committees’ 
Status Report.  May 2002 and September 2003.  We were not able to find more quantifiable data 
indicating actual cost savings. 
43 One staff member remains.  Vacancies on the part-time Commission have recently been filled. 
44 “Improving Trends in Safety at DWP.”  IBEW Presentation to Trustees.  2005. 
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Areas for Consideration 
 
The following are our suggestions related to these seven factors.  We are sure there are 
many additional ways they can be effectively addressed, if the parties are willing.  This 
list of recommendations may seem daunting, and we do not expect that most or all would 
all be implemented in the near future.  These challenging situations have taken years to 
create, and it is likely they will take years to fully resolve.  We do believe that significant 
progress can be made relatively quickly on some, however, and in the Conclusion to this 
section have suggested a few areas where we feel priority could be given. 
 
From our interviews it is clear that many city leaders believe there is currently an 
historic opportunity to revitalize Los Angeles and that this view is shared by others in the 
university, business, arts, neighborhood, faith-based and philanthropic communities.  We 
suggest that, wherever appropriate, the Mayor and City Council look to augment the 
coordination and implementation of volunteer services to assist with these and any other 
new initiatives that may be undertaken.   
 
Suggestion #1: 
“Open the City’s Books” to all stakeholders to assure transparency. 
 
Many city labor leaders, and their members, need to be convinced that there truly is a 
fiscal crisis.  As long as mistrust persists, it will be difficult for labor and management to 
move forward and collaborate on issues of critical importance to both.  Jurisdictions 
across the country have taken this step as a way to move forward with more constructive 
methods of bargaining, including interest based bargaining.45 For example, in Phoenix the 
same budget/fiscal status report that is sent to the City Council is also sent to all of the 
unions by the City Manager.   
 
In our discussions/interviews with Los Angeles leaders, we found a great deal of interest 
from both management and labor in pursuing a more transparent approach.  We believe 
that representatives from the city and a group of expert analysts should meet with 
union representatives, including labor economists and/or union research staff, for a 
series of presentations by management and discussions on the budget that will allow 
for follow-up research and questions.  The configuration of each group will likely vary 
according to the situation and circumstances, and the parties will need to determine how 
often they will occur.  One possible design would be to include CAO/CLA top economic 
analysts, representatives from the City Council and the Mayor’s office, staff from the 
Controller’s Office, and a representative from the independent city auditors hired by the 
Controller.  The auditors should prepare an analytical review of budget line items and 
discrete revenue sources for a five to ten year period.  This review would provide an 
historic depiction of the patterns of budgetary, expenditure and revenue growth or 
stagnation over the selected time period.  The implications of complying with the new 
GASB 43 and 45 pension regulations would be included.  In addition, economists’ 
projections for the state and the city, including demographic trends and real estate 
projections, would be a critical component.  (The state’s Legislative Analyst’s Office 
                                                 
45 Lavigne, Robert.  “Best Practices in Public Sector Human Resources: Wisconsin State Government.”  
Human Resource Management  (Fall 2002). 
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could be invited to assist with this presentation.)  It is important to look at projections, 
since even a one percent error in projections would result in a $40 million dollar 
difference in the city budget.   
 
One possible positive result of these discussions would be to attempt to craft negotiated 
labor agreements that spend money based on data-driven trends, instead of on the 
economic peaks and valleys that have sometimes resulted in the “boom or bust” 
negotiations of the past.  These have led to destructive hiring freezes and loss of staff.  
Looking at budget trends each year from the last five years and then projecting into the 
future five years, if current trends hold, may also be useful.  (In essence, projecting a ten-
year budget every year, as is currently done in Sunnyvale, California.)   It would, of 
course, have to be made very clear from the beginning that these sessions are designed to 
share fiscal information, not to debate about how the city is choosing to set priorities 
and/or allocate resources. 
 
Unions would be encouraged to share the results of these sessions with their members.  
Perhaps videotaping the sessions could be considered to allow large numbers of 
interested members to hear the same information and also allow for the “protection” of all 
involved.  (In New York State, the Speaker of the Assembly and Senate Majority Leader 
have begun the practice of allowing some of their actual budget discussions to be 
broadcast on television, with some positive results.46)  We realize these sessions may be 
very challenging at first and recommend the use of an experienced facilitator/mediator.  
Again, the purpose of the sessions would be to provide as much information as possible 
to union leaders and their membership about city finances, not to debate how items in the 
budget are allocated.  In the end, differences of opinion may remain over issues such as 
how much of a fund balance is necessary to preserve the city’s excellent bond rating 
and/or how much money should be transferred from DWP to the city’s coffers annually.  
Although nothing would prevent someone from attempting to distort the proceedings 
after they occur, we believe the effort would provide management with the opportunity to 
demonstrate that it is acting in good faith and accepts and respects the role of the unions 
in the process. 
 
Suggestion #2: 
Incorporate a variety of strategies, including labor-management 
cooperation, to assist in identifying efficiencies, streamlining city 
operations, increasing productivity, improving customer service, and 
enhancing the quality of work life. 
 
There is an old riddle that asks, “How do organizations make toast?  You burn it, and I’ll 
scrape it.”  Waste in government contributes to a loss of precious resources, reduced 
service delivery, low morale, cynicism, and often more waste or non-value added 
activity.  The “broken windows” theory applied to crime (that the mere presence of a few 
broken windows can encourage and result in much more significant damage) is also 
relevant here.  It is often easier to generate more waste or ignore inefficiencies and 
opportunities when staff feels that it makes little difference to point out what could be 
                                                 
46 For an interesting and humorous account, see:  Hakim, Danny.  “Progress in Albany.  Two Leaders Can 
Now Bicker in Public.”  New York Times.  April 1, 2006. 
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made better, because no one will listen and/or take any action to fix the problems.  In our 
discussions with elected officials, managers and union staff, we were impressed by the 
interest expressed in having a more professionally managed and well-run city.  Two very 
effective ways to do this are through the use of management audits/reviews and 
improved managerial and supervisory practices.  We suggest the expanded use of both, 
and recognize the city is already beginning to move rapidly in this direction, and is 
looking at a variety of areas, including a more effective use of overtime. 
 
Los Angeles has neglected the training and mentoring functions for its managers for 
many years, in large part due to lack of funding.  Blending mentoring with low-cost but 
effective, targeted training (technology can assist here) could pay dividends in cost 
savings and improved service delivery.  It could also result in higher productivity, less 
conflict, improved morale, and fewer settlement costs as poor supervisory and managerial 
practices are addressed.  We suggest the following training/mentoring initiatives be 
considered: 
• Activity-Based Costing 
• Competitive Benchmarking 
• Customer Quality Assurance 
• Generic managerial and supervisory skills 
• Labor Relations 
• Performance Management 
• Performance Measurement 
• Process Reviews and Work Redesign 
• Strategic Planning 
 
We would also suggest Los Angeles evaluate and consider adopting a “Mayor’s 
Management Report” that would be similar to the report provided by the Mayor in New 
York City, and mandated by the New York City Charter.47  This report provides a very 
useful snapshot of how well the City performs vital services.  It includes everything from 
public safety to rodent control.  The city also issues a “Preliminary Mayor’s Management 
Report” that forecasts expected levels of service based on the preliminary budget.   
 
A fourth method is to establish labor-management committees that include employee 
involvement and a focus on improving outcomes.  The activities of the committees need 
to be strategically selected and driven by data that assists in identifying the most 
promising opportunities.  In the short-term, a small number of potentially high-impact 
projects would need to be very carefully selected. In the long-term, the goal would be to 
establish a “critical mass” of such significant high-quality labor-management committee 
work that this activity would assist in “moving the metrics” of key performance 
indicators for city government in a very positive direction. 
 
Labor-management committees have done a great deal of impressive work in the public 
sector in state and local government, and we believe this same level of achievement is 
                                                 
47 See www.nyc.gov for the complete text of these documents. 
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possible in Los Angeles.48  It is only possible, however, if the right mechanisms are in 
place and the best methods are used to help ensure avoidance of the same factors that 
derailed some of the previous efforts in Los Angeles (and in many other organizations).  
While it takes an unusual confluence of circumstances, including the right people, to 
obtain the maximum benefits, we believe that it is currently possible in Los Angeles.   
… 
The following are suggestions to support the work of the committees: 
 
o It is critical that the work of the committees be overseen by a body that would be 
accountable to elected officials and also have close and good working 
relationships with the unions, including the County Federation of Labor.  We are 
suggesting that the existing Labor-Management Workgroup oversee the efforts 
of the committees. The Labor-Management Workgroup would also assist in the 
coordination of any joint economic development and strategic planning initiatives, 
as well as provide a link to management efforts to enhance revenue, and plan and 
improve operations, including succession planning.  Responsibilities would 
include coordination with the newly formed Mayor’s Performance Unit and the 
Quality and Productivity Commission. The management and labor co-chairs of 
the committees would be accountable to the Labor-Management Workgroup, and 
the Workgroup would have the formal and informal power to keep them on track 
and focused on results.  A part-time budget analyst could be assigned as staff to 
the Workgroup and assist in the assessment of actual cost savings, as well as 
assist with the documentation of enhancements in service delivery.  Immediate, 
continuous feedback and publicizing of accomplishments would also help to 
establish credibility and build momentum.  Over time, a summary of the results of 
these efforts, described in specific, observable and measurable terms, could also 
be generated by the Workgroup, posted on the city’s web site, and linked when 
appropriate to the Mayor’s Performance Indicators we are recommending be 
established.   
 
o Much thought would need to be given to the type of city-wide and departmental 
initiatives that would be established before work began.  Effective scanning of 
issues and opportunities is essential.  Again, we believe “less is more” and that 
any initiatives undertaken initially be few in number and very carefully selected.  
Criteria that would need to be considered and weighed for each initiative may 
include:  
• the projected cost savings from eliminating wasteful practices and 
procedures and/or adopting new ones 
• enhanced service delivery 
• the time and effort required 
• the value that would be added by employee and union participation 
• and the overall impact on the city and/or the workforce.  
                                                 
48 U.S. Department of Labor.  “Working Better Together for Public Service.  Report of the Task Force on 
Excellence in State and Local Government Through Labor-Management Cooperation.”  1996.  Many 
examples of public sector labor-management cooperation have also been provided in the reference 
material cited in the Appendix. 
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o Workers’ Compensation and pension costs are possible areas for citywide 
JLMC’s that several city and union leaders have suggested.  Departmental 
initiatives could occur in a few departments where there is interest, and also 
significant opportunities for improvement.  Possibilities might include an 
analysis of the purchasing and use of expensive equipment, and/or more effective 
deployment of staff.  (In addition, at some point we recommend that the new 
labor-management health benefit plan recently begun in King County, 
Washington State be studied and considered for possible adoption.  It is designed 
to contain health costs by providing incentives for participants. Employees and 
family members who participate in a program to optimize their health pay less for 
deductibles, co-payments and out of pocket maximum payments than those who 
do not.)  
 
o The committees would need to use “cut to the chase” organizational 
development methods specifically designed for the public sector, with a track 
record of success, in areas including process analysis, conflict resolution, 
problem solving and work redesign.  It is important not to become 
inappropriately consumed by too much of a focus on “team building” and on how 
people are feeling, a common pitfall in labor-management work.  The city needs 
excellent results, and quickly.  A very powerful way to build a team is to have 
people working together to make things better.  Local universities and consultants 
have very helpful methods that can be used.  We have also developed a great deal 
of relevant material, and would be happy to provide it to the city at no cost.49  If 
desired, we would also be willing to work with local organizations in the sharing 
of promising practices and the creation of “centers of excellence,” to assist in the 
actual implementation of these practices. 
 
o There are already many city workers and managers with much experience and 
excellent skills in facilitation and organizational development, and we 
recommend they participate in the work of the committees as facilitators and 
analysts.  Building internal capability is extremely important.  Short-term 
external assistance to organize and mobilize these internal resources would help 
to get an aggressive effort in place as quickly as possible.  A number of local, 
very qualified individuals from universities and consulting firms with relevant 
experience might be willing to participate, and perhaps also donate time.  (We 
have also donated a great deal of faculty time to this study and would be willing 
to volunteer to help with this initiative, if desired.)  In many instances, grant 
money, including funds from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 
have been available to jurisdictions for this purpose.   
 
The following is an examination of the roles and incentives involved: 
 
The satisfaction of enhancing services, improving management practices and morale, 
saving taxpayers’ money, and receiving recognition would be reward enough under 
normal circumstances for many workers who might participate.  In our observations of 
                                                 
49 Calicchia, Marcia.  Strategies and Methods for Public Sector Labor-Management Committees.  Cornell 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations and the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University/PSLMC.  1999 and 2005.  Other material is referenced in the Appendix. 
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previous similar situations, however, when negotiations are particularly contentious, 
and/or participants feel there is an unjust situation, we have found that interest in 
participating, or the actual quality of the involvement, is negatively and often 
dramatically affected.  (These feelings are exacerbated if there have been previous 
attempts at labor-management cooperation that have failed.)  This is a particularly vexing 
“chicken and egg” problem.  It would be reasonable to wonder if there realistically is a 
way out of this potential problem, where uncooperative behavior leads to waste and less 
available resources, which then result in additional bad feelings and poorer results. 
 
The Controller’s Task Order Solicitation for this study asked us to “evaluate the roles and 
incentives of each party” in the process, including those of “the union leadership and 
members, managers, elected officials and the general public.”  At this point, we would 
like to examine these in more detail because we believe this analysis will identify areas 
for consideration.  
 
After reading the information in this Section, it is not difficult to understand why much of 
the general public, many elected officials and most of the press would have difficulty 
empathizing with the concerns of the city workers and their unions over pay increases.  In 
a city where approximately 37 percent of the residents are “working poor,” many city 
jobs pay very well and include the type of health care and retirement benefits that are 
becoming increasingly rare in the private sector.  While it is important to pay salaries that 
will help attract and retain top talent in city jobs, the city has many serious challenges 
that much needed revenue could help to address (almost seventy percent of the current 
general fund budget is allocated to salaries and benefits.)  This percent is common in 
many municipalities, yet it still places significant limits on what issues the city can 
address.   
 
From the perspective of the city workers and their unions, however, there are many city 
workers who also struggle economically, and do an excellent job of providing important 
and often critical services.  Vocational Workers I earn between $22,697 and  
$23,970, per year.   Vocational Worker II positions have salaries between $21,381 and 
$26, 559.  Recreation Assistants (who often are employed part-time with no benefits, and 
do valuable child care and gang prevention community work) earn between $9.79 and 
$12.79 an hour.50  A number of union leaders have pointed out that city jobs offer hope 
for others of a better life, and pitting groups of workers against each other in a “race to 
the bottom” is counter-productive in the long run.   
 
Even members of the general public who agree with the arguments in favor of supporting 
the lower paid members of the workforce may still understandably struggle with the idea 
that the higher paying positions in city government deserve substantial pay increases, 
especially in light of the many financial challenges currently facing the city.  And, of 
course, for the higher paying city jobs the question arises of “how much is ever enough” 
for any (or most) of us?  In our work, we have rarely heard a worker or manager say, 
“You know, I really didn’t deserve or need that raise.”  An added dynamic here is the 
issue of perceived inequity, which can fuel very powerful resentments and lead to 
                                                 
50 City of Los Angeles, Personnel Department.  “City of Los Angeles Class Title/Salary Table.”  November 
17, 2005. 
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decreased job satisfaction.  Motivation theorists have pondered these and related question 
for years.51   
 
We believe the changes in the negotiation process itself that we recommend in Section I 
can be helpful and lead to better relationships and a more professional approach to 
negotiating.  We are also realists, and see the difficulties inherent in the current situation.  
Most, if not all, of the city unions and their members (almost all of the city managers are 
also union members) are not likely to be satisfied with only these enhancements to the 
negotiating process.  They want equity with the IBEW contract and an end to differences 
in salaries for the same or very similar work.  We are not advocating for or against 
comparable raises in this report, as we feel the improved negotiations process should take 
its course.  We do believe, however, that the city faces serious challenges, and that new, 
creative ways of negotiating and managing are required.  (Each 1 percent increase in 
salaries costs taxpayers $13 million dollars, according to city officials.52)   
… 
 
There are four actions that should be considered to help address the issue of equity, 
reduce potential conflict, result in additional savings, and place no additional burden 
on taxpayers.   
 
1) The first would be a continued but more vocal, strong commitment by elected 
officials and management to fix the problems plaguing the Department of 
Water and Power.  We understand the Board has been reconstituted, independent 
audits are forthcoming, and an analysis of large potential revenue sources, such as 
how land is currently leased, is also planned.  We have the sense that these actions 
and concerns about DWP may not be communicated well enough to the general 
public and to the city unions.  This concern has been fueled recently by the 
possibility of rate increases and additional reports of questionable spending 
activity.  We suggest a review to see what else can be done to save money and 
better manage the DWP, and that reform efforts be communicated more 
effectively to the general public, the press and the city workforce.  In addition, 
work on a contingency strike plan is also an area to address. 
 
2) Our second suggestion is to build creative discussions of how to eliminate 
disparities with the IBEW over time (it will be a long term process) into each set 
of negotiations. This movement would also reflect reasonable compensation for 
the positions, as determined by objective standards.  This would include salaries 
that were too high, as well as salaries that were too low.   For example, perhaps 
raises for these lower paid members could be negotiated at a certain level, and if 
the city were to do much better economically, those workers would share in the 
rewards, using a predetermined formula.  (This would be similar to the “crawling 
peg” concept used by economists.  A mechanism would allow increased rates to 
float in response to changes in the economy, but only by a defined incremental 
amount per unit of time, such as one-tenth of a point per month.)  The solutions 
would need to be tailored to each specific situation, of course, and would be 
                                                 
51 For two excellent resources on motivation, see Wilson, Timothy.  Strangers to Ourselves.  Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.  Also Frank, Robert.  Passions Within Reason.  New York: Norton, 
1988.   
52 Orlov, Rick.  “Villaraigosa Offers $6.7 Billion Budget.”  Daily News (Los Angeles).  April 21, 2006. 
 61
unique to each union and to the needs of the city.  Some of the methods used in 
interest-based bargaining (described in more detail in Section I) could be very 
helpful in doing this.  Creative solutions will need to be generated, and focusing 
on the underlying interests of all of the parties, instead of on tightly held 
positions, could assist in developing these.   
 
3) The third suggestion, if all parties are willing, is to establish a facilitated, 
citywide Joint Labor Management Committee (JLMC) on eliminating 
disparities over time.  The proprietary agencies would be included.  This 
citywide committee could address the longer-term issues associated with the 
problem, including the disruptive effect of job transfers and resignations on 
effective city management.   
 
The adoption of many of the suggestions in this study is complicated by the fact 
that, over the years, Los Angeles has gone from being “the union-free 
alternative to San Francisco” to a city where organized labor has become 
increasingly powerful.  Los Angeles has one of the most dynamic (if not the most 
dynamic) labor movements in the country.  In addition, as Section I has described, 
city government has sometimes historically abdicated its managerial 
responsibility within the collective bargaining process.  This has, at times, 
actually increased the power of the unions, and the resulting pressures on elected 
officials.  While political power is diffuse and distributed among a variety of 
groups, labor has a well-documented, powerful influence on the electoral process 
in city elections.  Unless there is a major catastrophe, it is highly unlikely that 
there will be motivational “sticks” such as layoffs or the privatization of city 
services for non-cooperation or job actions anytime soon.53  (In fact, at least two 
unions have some form of permanent no-privatization guarantee built into their 
contracts.)  It has often been the very real threat of privatization that has been a 
major motivating factor in work with public sector labor-management 
committees.54  (Layoffs are so demoralizing that it is not as common to find 
creative responses to cope with them, although it does happen.  In Phoenix, during 
a fiscal downturn, fire fighters took unpaid furloughs to maintain staffing levels 
rather than have layoffs.)   
 
4) For this reason, our fourth suggestion is to work with the labor- management 
committees to develop incentives that would result from their work in 
generating documented savings.  While many may object to the concept of 
allowing financial incentives for this labor-management work, we would argue 
that without incentives the potential cost savings that could materialize are not 
likely to happen at all, and that this motivational concept is well understood by 
those in the private sector.  Many in the private sector also understand the great 
                                                 
53 For a useful analysis of privatization, see Sclar, Elliot.  You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: the 
Economics of Privatization.  Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 2000. 
54 U.S. Department of Labor.  “Working Better Together for Public Service.  Report of the Task Force on 
Excellence in State and Local Government Through Labor-Management Cooperation.”  1996. 
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gains in productivity that can be obtained when the ideas of those closest to the 
work are appropriately considered and implemented. 55 
 
This fourth suggestion would provide additional motivation for participation in 
the labor-management committees, and also begin to reduce the inequities that are 
occurring.  In the long run it may also help reduce managerial problems stemming 
from the chronic transfers of staff to the DWP.  It could also help with the actual 
negotiations, and reduce conflict.  It would not cost taxpayers additional money, 
as only money from newly found savings would be included.   Financial 
incentives in government for labor-management work have occurred with 
considerable success in a number of jurisdictions, including Louisville, San 
Diego, Miami-Dade, Philadelphia, the Veterans Administration, and King 
County, Washington State.56 There have also been miserable failures.  The 
program would have to be very carefully designed and negotiated to clarify what 
types of items would be eligible for inclusion (to address potential suggestions 
such as “let’s just fire all of the managers”), and to reduce the potential for 
unintended consequences, but we believe the benefits could be substantial.57  The 
Labor-Management Workgroup would oversee the initiative, and a budget analyst 
attached part-time to that office could assist in the assessment of actual savings.   
 
One last important component of the labor-management work would be the 
involvement of unions in risk avoidance, helping to identify and help mitigate any 
situations that could lead to the city having to pay damages.  Los Angeles has 
historically spent millions of dollars on legal settlements, and involving and listening to 
the unions as part of an “early warning system” could be extremely beneficial.  Perhaps 
this could be formalized by establishing a joint grievance and arbitration “screening 
process” citywide and/or within departments that have significant numbers of grievances 
and arbitrations.  This joint activity would augment the work by management that is 
already being done in some departments and by the CAO.  In addition, involving the 
unions in the development of disciplinary standards, training academy curriculum, etc., 
could assist in reducing risk. 
 
We would also suggest that the city public sector unions in Los Angeles consider 
forming a Public Sector Conference similar to the one that has operated in New York 
City for many years.  That body has advisors from several of the private sector unions as 
well, and they have often provided much helpful advice and, at times, acted as behind the 
scenes mediators.  We would suggest that the first agenda item for the group be a joint 
exploration of other ways the issue of inequity in salaries in the city workforce could be 
addressed.  Of course, the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor could also play a key 
role here.  The Public Sector Conference may also consider creating a form of coalition 
bargaining.  This is a way of streamlining some parts of the negotiation process for both 
                                                 
55 See Kotter, John.  Leading Change.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard Business School Press, 1996.  Also 
Collins, Jim.  Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap...and Others Don’t.  New York:  
Harper Business, 2001. 
56 See Beach, Allyne and Linda Kaboolian.  “Working Better Together.”  Harvard University, Kennedy 
School of Government and the Public Sector Labor Management Committee.  2005.  Also 
www.plsmc.gov. 
57 City and County of San Francisco and IFPTE Local 21.  “Union-City Partnership Program Proposal.”  
March 2005.  Contains a review of recent national gain sharing efforts, as well as research on criteria 
for success. 
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labor and management that will be discussed in Section I (similar work has been done in 
the past in Los Angeles, with many unions participating in a citywide JLMC on benefits). 
 
Labor-management work can be very challenging under the best of circumstances.  In the  
current environment in Los Angeles, the strategies described above would appear to us to 
have the best chance of providing additional incentive to collaborate to achieve 
efficiencies, while improving the overall effectiveness of government operations. 
 
Suggestion #3: 
Address the succession planning issue, with the unions.  
 
Los Angeles officials are currently studying the issue of succession planning.  We also 
believe considering at some point the establishment of departmental JLMCs, where both 
parties believe it would add value, to explore what can be done to address the crisis in 
succession planning.  A citywide JLMC could be established as well, to coordinate 
efforts, draft policies that would apply to all departments, and bring research and ideas 
from other sources to the attention of the departments.  Much has been written about 
succession planning in recent years, and many promising practices (including knowledge 
transfer methods, the use of “bridge” programs, the documentation of procedures, social 
network analysis, and strategies for the retention of staff, including younger staff) have 
been developed.  A city department could be tasked with providing a summary of the best 
thinking available, and/or perhaps consultants or universities would be willing to 
contribute their expertise.  Foundation funding might be available for this purpose.  The 
unions could also assist with recruitment initiatives, where appropriate.  We would 
highly recommend involving the proprietary departments in this endeavor, if that is 
possible. 
 
In the current fiscal climate, it may be tempting to once again consider imposing hiring 
freezes as a cost-saving solution.  As mentioned earlier, this has not only led to serious 
difficulties in managing the departments in the past, it would also wreak havoc with any 
thoughtful attempt to manage and plan for the upcoming wave of retirements. 
 
Over time, current mentoring, vocational and apprenticeship programs should be 
expanded, wherever possible, to create opportunities for youth in Los Angeles to 
become part of the city’s workforce.  There are many initiatives currently under way.  
These include LA Bridges, CITY JOBS, LA Youth Opportunity Movement, LA One 
Source System, an expanded “Learn and Earn,” and a new city-wide First Source Hiring 
Program for city contractors.  Ensuring that these are integrated and coordinated with 
succession planning efforts is important, and the citywide JLMC and Labor-Management 
Workgroup could assist with that task. 
 
It is also important to enhance the effectiveness of the many managers and supervisors 
who will be newly promoted as a result of the upcoming retirements.  Los Angeles has 
some very talented managers and supervisors who can assist in the mentoring process.  It 
also has some managers and supervisors who will not be retiring in the near future who 
would benefit from mentoring, as well as training.  The current administration appears to 
be very committed to managing in a professional manner, and needs to ensure that its 
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plan to enhance managerial and supervisory skills includes succession planning related 
issues.   
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning again that the morale of those left behind after this very 
large wave of pending retirements is an important consideration, and is another reason to 
seriously explore the suggestions provided here. 
 
Suggestion #4: 
Develop a citywide strategic plan for all of Los Angeles, including plans 
for specific policy areas.  Involve the major stakeholders, including the 
unions. 
 
Over the years Los Angeles has undertaken many innovative and highly successful 
planning initiatives.  However, these have tended to be fragmented, and have not 
included the creation of a vision and thoughtful strategic plan for the city as a whole.  
Creating and integrating strategic plans for specific policy areas, including those that 
already exist, within the larger strategic plan would be an important part of this effort.  
Other cities, including Fort Lauderdale, Chattanooga, Sunnyvale (California), and 
Portland (Oregon) have been very thoughtful in the development of strategic plans that 
have included major stakeholders and brought impressive results.  The inclusion of Los 
Angeles unions, businesses, community organizations, and faith-based organizations, is 
essential.   In addition, “America Speaks” style town meetings with constituents would 
support the growing movement toward public involvement in strategic planning of 
government services.  Coordination and integration with the city’s new Youth Master 
Plan, once it is developed, would also be beneficial.   
 
We also believe that other cities be consulted for promising practices, and that the great 
talent that exists in the Los Angeles university, philanthropic and consulting communities 
be tapped to assist with this effort. 
  
Suggestion #5: 
Bring together major stakeholders, including the unions, to do both 
short and long-term economic development planning for the city as 
well as for the region. 
 
We stated our concern earlier that unless the “economic pie” is expanded for both public 
and private sector workers in Los Angeles, future labor negotiations will grow 
increasingly contentious.  We have also mentioned many of the serious challenges facing 
the city.  We feel that a holistic, long-term economic development plan, coordinated with 
any strategic planning that is done, would be very beneficial.  Currently, there are a 
number of potentially promising initiatives, including the Century Boulevard Corridor, 
the Valley Plaza in North Hollywood, and the Convention Center hotel.  Los Angeles has 
a long and rich history of planning and implementing worthwhile and successful 
economic development projects.  There has not been, however, a sustained citywide 
economic development plan developed by the major stakeholders, including the business 
community, elected officials, community representatives, philanthropists, unions, 
convention and visitors bureau members, and local experts.  In addition, while much 
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attention has been focused downtown over the last thirty years, the other parts of the city 
have often been neglected.  We believe Los Angeles has a great “brand,” and the 
investment in time and energy of a thoughtful, inclusive approach would bring great 
dividends.  There is also a great need for regional economic development, and to 
integrate both efforts.  We believe the City should concurrently focus on a few projects 
with the relevant stakeholders in order to begin to address immediate needs.   This 
would include identifying several initiatives that have a high potential for adding new 
revenues, as well as providing higher paying jobs for those earning less than a living 
wage.    
 
Cities that currently have very effective economic development strategies with 
impressive results include Seattle/Tacoma, Chicago, Dallas/Fort Worth, and Indianapolis.  
In Seattle/Tacoma, a consortium includes city and county government officials, the 
private sector, colleges, and organized labor.  The marketing arm is the Seattle Trade 
Development Alliance, and the focus is on building trade in domestic and international 
markets.  In Chicago, the entity credited with much of the success is World Business 
Chicago, a not-for-profit whose board is made up largely of high-level private sector 
executives and chaired by the Mayor.  Indianapolis is focused on rebuilding the city’s 
commercial core and resuscitating a dying regional economy.  The Indianapolis Regional 
Center Plan 2020 was developed by using a three hundred-person stakeholder process, 
and was adopted as part of the City’s Comprehensive Plan in March 2004.58  In addition 
to longer-term economic development planning, there are also many pressing shorter-
term needs.  
 
We would like to offer a few suggestions for consideration when thinking about 
economic development.  (Of course, local planners, and universities will have many 
others.)  
 
o There is a great deal of enthusiasm across the country for Richard Florida’s ideas 
about the creative economy.59 Innovation is key to economic productivity.  Cities 
that attract creative people, and invest in the quality of life, recreational 
amenities and educational and entrepreneurial support they need, are investing 
in the most critical resource for their economic future, people.  Diversity, which 
is one of Los Angeles’ strengths, is also a positive attraction for this “creative 
class,” as is the strong arts culture already in existence here.    
 
o For too long economic development policy has focused almost exclusively on 
industries, but in a global economy, firms do not necessarily stay long.  Workers 
are more inclined to stay, and many planners are now recommending that 
economic development focus on occupations as well.60  They suggest it is 
important to first identify what it is that makes a city distinctive.  Then support 
those occupations, because those who inhabit them will most likely stay in the 
                                                 
58 See www.indyrc2020.org. This web site shows how the plan was developed and is being implemented.  
It contains a great deal of other useful information, and also allows for on-line discussion of important 
issues. 
59 Florida, Richard L.  The Rise of the Creative Class, and How It’s Transforming Work, Leisure, 
Community, and Everyday Life.  New York:  Basic Books, 2002. 
60 Markusen, Ann.  “Targeting Occupations in Regional and Community Economic Development.”  Journal 
of the American Planning Association 70.3 (2004). 
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city longer than the firms cities typically try to attract with tax abatements.  Greg 
LeRoy demonstrates that investing in good jobs is the key to economic 
development.61  Research shows that public sector investments are usually more 
helpful to economic development than tax abatements.62  The best way to 
promote economic growth is to invest in quality physical infrastructure, social 
infrastructure (quality of life, amenities, child care, etc.), the labor force, and 
sound and efficient government procedures that facilitate business productivity.  
Focusing almost exclusively on industrial attraction is a failed strategy, as 
productivity investments are the key to sustainable economic development in the 
long term. 
 
o Los Angeles should also focus on the lower end of the economic spectrum.  Job 
training, child care, and expanding retail to underserved areas where there is 
much poverty are all important.  Michael Porter has argued that, in addition to 
issues of equity, investing in such areas often has more market potential than 
people realize.63  
 
o In addition, the city can enhance its efforts to work with educators, hospitals and 
other sectors to ensure high quality of life and services.  This attracts and retains 
workers and provides critical support to the local population.  Child care is an 
example of an area where cities across the nation are investing in a whole range of 
services that make them quality places to live and work.64  That type of service 
attracts and retains workers, and their employers.  “Locational stickiness” is a 
critical factor.  What can Los Angeles do to make it attractive for firms to stay?  
Information networks, technical resources and marketing channels are some of 
the pieces of “cooperative competition” that make business clusters and 
industrial districts popular economic development strategies.  For example, the 
entertainment industry will not leave Los Angeles because so much of the related 
service industries and talent pool is available locally.  How much it chooses at 
times to work elsewhere, however (and that figure is growing), is partly a result of 
how attractive the city is. 
…… 
 
We believe well thought out, inclusive and well-coordinated economic development 
initiatives, both short and long-term, are essential if Los Angeles is going to be able to 
                                                 
61 LeRoy, Greg.  No More Candy Store: States and Cities Making Job Subsidies Accountable. Washington, 
DC:  Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, 1997. 
62 Bartik, Timothy J.  Local Economic Development Policies.  Kalamazoo, MI:  W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research, 2003.  Also Lynch, Robert. G.  Rethinking Growth Strategies: How State and 
Local Taxes and Services Affect Economic Development.  Washington, DC:  Economic Policy Institute, 
2004. 
63 Porter, Michael E.  “The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City.”  Harvard Business Review 73.3 
(1995).  Also Porter, Michael E.  “The Economic Performance of Regions.” Regional Studies 37.6 and 
37.7 (2003). 
64 Warner, Mildred E.  “Local Government Support for Community-Based Economic Development.”  The 
Municipal Yearbook 2001.  Washington, DC: International City County Management Association.  Also 
Warner, M.E. et al. Economic Development Strategies to Promote Quality Child Care.  Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Department of City and Regional Planning. 
http://government.cce.cornell.edu/doc/pdf/EconDevStrat.pdf.  
 67
meet the many challenges it currently faces.  The pieces are already there and ready to be 
put in place. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We wish to emphasize again that it will take time to consider and possibly adopt some or 
all of these ideas for consideration.  Even if a third of them are undertaken, and done well 
in the next year or two, we would expect to see some significant improvements in labor 
relations in Los Angeles, as well as a positive impact on the city itself.  
 
We are sensitive to the fiscal implications of our proposals, and believe the cost is 
minimal, as it will primarily involve re-focusing the activities of some existing staff and 
strategically leveraging volunteer and foundation/grant support.  Areas of initial emphasis 
could include: 
 
• a focus on significantly improving management operations, and 
performance measurement (in part through labor-management 
cooperation) 
  
• transparency in the sharing of fiscal information with the unions 
  
• a recognition and statement of the need to eliminate inequities in 
salaries over time, and some movement in that direction 
 
• a continuation of the effort to address succession planning, and 
involving the unions in helping to address the issue, including 
recruitment, where appropriate 
 
• a more concerted effort to analyze areas of potential legal risk, and 
involving the unions in those discussions 
 
• and at least some initial steps towards developing more thoughtful and 
inclusive strategic planning and economic development initiatives 
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Appendix A  
Los Angeles Organizations Participating in the Interviews 
 
We especially want to thank those we interviewed, who were so thoughtful in their 
responses to our questions and very gracious despite the many competing demands on 
their time.   These include managers and/or staff from the following City organizations, 
unions and interested stakeholders:  
 
• AFSCME 
• AIRPORT  
• CAO’s OFFICE 
• CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 
• CITY CONTROLLER’S OFFICE 
• DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS 
• EAA 
• EERC (City Council Members) 
 Eric Garcetti 
 Wendy Greuel 
 Alex Padilla 
 Bernard Parks 
 Dennis Zine 
• EMPLOYEE RELATIONS BOARD 
• FIRE DEPARTMENT   
• HARBOR 
• IBEW 
• JAIL 
• LIBRARY 
• LOS ANGELES COUNTY FEDERATION OF LABOR 
• MAYOR’S OFFICE   
• PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT 
• POLICE DEPARTMENT 
• POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE 
• RECREATION AND PARKS 
• BUREAU OF SANITATION  
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• SEIU 
• UFLAC 
• DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND POWER 
 
We would also like to thank the following Los Angeles employees for their invaluable 
assistance and patience in providing documentation and answers to our seemingly never 
ending lists of questions:  Maritta Aspen, Karla Cortez, Mary Higgins, Gordon Lawler, 
and Royce Menkus, of the CAO’s office, and Maggie Whelan, General Manager of 
Personnel.  
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Appendix B 
The Negotiation Process 
 
There may be slight variations on this process, depending upon the circumstances. 
 
 
 
1  Proposals regarding departmental issues and working conditions are usually negotiated first, prior to the 
economic instructions provided by the EERC.  They may wait until after the budget is resolved to 
negotiate economic issues. 
The unions typically poll their members and develop bargaining strategies well in 
advance of formal negotiations. 
 
CAO negotiators review local and national economic data, as well as settlement 
trends, and develop recommendations based on trends and predictions a month or 
two before negotiations begin. 
CAO meets with city department managers to develop management’s proposals on 
departmental issues and working conditions before meeting with the union. 
Continued on 
next page 
The CAO initially listens to union proposals, looks at key issues that might 
affect operations and  productivity, and determines the value of other issues. 
Negotiations begin (usually March or April).  The union brings its list of 
proposals, both economic and non-economic.1 
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2  Non-economic issues are not always presented to the EERC.  They are included if the perceived impact 
will be significant, and/or will affect many departments. 
 
 
 
 
After several negotiating sessions, the CAO presents a package of proposals on 
economic and non-economic issues to the EERC that have city-wide implications, 
or a major impact on departmental operations.2 
Beginning bargaining instructions for the fiscal aspects of the MOU are agreed upon 
and given to the CAO by the EERC. 
The CAO receives modified instructions (including bargaining specific issues) as 
negotiations progress. 
Give and take offers and counter offers may occur until a tentative agreement is 
reached. 
The tentative agreement is approved by the EERC.  
Continued on 
next page 
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Once ratified, all of the MOU documents, including the salary tables, are finalized. 
The City Attorney’s approval is obtained, and the Controller is notified. 
The final MOU is presented to the City Council for approval. 
Once the EERC approves the tentative agreement, the union is able to take the 
tentative agreement to its membership for ratification. 
End 
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Additional information about the process:   
 
 Disputes arising out of the labor relations process are addressed by the ERB, 
including impasse, mediation and fact-finding.  
 
 Side letters may be included with the MOU for issues that could not be resolved 
during negotiations, or are not appropriate for inclusion in the permanent 
document. 
 
 The CAO meets with the EERC on the second and fourth Tuesday mornings.  
Briefing material is provided to the EERC on the Friday morning prior to each 
meeting.  At the meetings, the CAO provides a report on economic and non-
economic issues, with recommendations.  Discussion follows.   During 
negotiations, anytime the CAO presents to the EERC, the CAO notifies the union.  
The union is usually allowed to make its own presentation at any point as well. 
The CAO is present for the union’s presentation, but the union is not present for 
the CAO’s presentation.  The EERC may ask questions, then deliberates and 
votes.  The CAO notifies the union of the outcome when they next meet.  
 
 
NOTE: An important exception to the above is the process used by the Department of 
Water and Power.  In 1996 the General Manager of the Department of Water 
and Power appeared before the EERC and requested permission to remove the 
CAO from the process, and to allow the General Manager of the Department to 
conduct the negotiations.  Permission was granted, although no changes have 
been made to the Employee Relations Ordinance.  Bargaining instructions are 
provided by the EERC to Department management.  (The EERC may request 
the CAO to provide recommendations regarding the instructions.)  MOUs with 
the Department of Water and Power are ratified by the City Council.  
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Appendix C 
Documents and Publications Reviewed or Cited 
 
(We have also included a wide variety of reference material, for those interested in 
further exploring ideas presented in this study.) 
 
Allen, Chris and Marcia Calicchia.  Negotiating Effectively.  Ithaca, NY:  Cornell 
University ILR, 2003.  (Training material, available upon request.) 
Allen, Chris, Marcia Calicchia, and Rani Findlay.  How to Conduct a Process Review.  
Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University ILR, 2004.  (Training material, available 
upon request.) 
Allen, Chris, Marcia Calicchia, Rani Findlay and Cindy Franklin.  Coaching for 
Accountability and Results.  Cornell University ILR, 2005.  (Training 
material, available upon request.) 
Allen, Chris, Marcia Calicchia, Rani Findlay and Cindy Franklin.  Emotional Intelligence 
For Labor-Management Committees.  Cornell University ILR, 2003.  
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Labor-Management Partnerships.  On-line Case Studies.   
Public Sector Case Studies: 
o Innovations in American Government Awards.   
http://www.innovations.harvard.edu. 
o Public Sector Labor-Management Committee.  http://www.psmlc.org 
o The Council for Excellence in Government.  http://www.excelgov.org/. 
Private Sector Case Studies: 
o “BUILT-RITE Construction Industry Program (Philadelphia Area Labor-
Management).  http://www.palmnet.org/job_site.asp. 
o  “Saskatoon Chemicals and Communications, Energy & Chemicals Workers 
(Canada).”  
http://www.moderntimesworkplace.com/video_cd_library/For_People_The_B
usiness.pdf. 
o “UAW/Ford Cleveland Engine Plant #2 and more cross-sector case studies.”  
http://www.fmcs.gov/internet/categoryList.asp?categoryID=28. 
o “VA Healthcare Systems—VISN Region 2 Partnership Council.”   
o Partnership home page:  
http://www.appc1.va.gov/visns/visn02/emp/labor.html. 
o Case Study:  
http://www.appc1.va.gov/visns/visn02/emp/partnershipcouncil.doc. 
o Goalsharing:  
http://www.appc1.va.gov/visns/visn02/leading/goalsharing.html.. 
o “Working Together for the Public Service.”  
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/library/downloads/keyWorkplaceDocuments/Worki
ngTogether.pdf.  
